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1 Introduction
Given the rising sentiment against globalization and the impasse of trade negotiations at the
multilateral front, it is important to provide a historical assessment of what the GATT/WTO
has imparted on the world economy. In this paper, we provide such a holistic evaluation of the
most important multilateral undertaking at trade liberalization after the World War II. We com-
bine the nonparametric matching method (Chang and Lee, 2011) to identify the direct effects of
GATT/WTO membership on trade flows, and use them as inputs to structural trade models to
quantify the welfare effects of GATT/WTO in its entire history of 1950–2015 for as many as 180
countries (where data permit).
Our contributions are distinct in three folds. First, instead of restricting the focus to tariffs
(Ossa, 2014; Caliendo et al., 2017), we design the estimation strategy to capture potentially all
changes in trade cost (tariffs or nontariff barriers, variable or fixed trade costs) for each bilateral
trade relationship due to GATT/WTO. Second, as documented by Anderson and van Wincoop
(2004, p. 694–695), public tariff data are available only since 1988 from TRAINS, and even then,
the entries are plagued with substantial incompleteness. By passing tariffs and relying on the
GATT/WTO membership status as indicators of treatment, we are able to provide a compre-
hensive impact analysis for all countries in the world and in each year during 1950–2015. This
complements the existing studies that are often restricted to a subset of countries or a snapshot
year in quantifying the welfare effects of trade agreements. As a whole, looking back across the
trade negotiation rounds since GATT/WTO’s beginning helps us put the current welfare effects in
perspective (against its historical trajectory). Third, we conduct quantitative analysis in a consis-
tent estimation and structural framework that incorporates potentially alternative margins of trade
(intensive, extensive, and firm entry). The results are subjected to extensive robustness checks (in
model specifications and parameter values). In addition to the main analysis, we also evaluate the
interaction of GATT/WTO with preferential trade agreements (PTAs), the GATT/WTO’s impact
on global income disparity, and the important case of China’s accession to GATT/WTO. This
study thus provides an overall appraisal of this multilateral trade institution.
As documented by Jackson (1997), GATT/WTO has induced policy changes in many areas
beyond tariffs (e.g., in quotas, technical barriers to trade, trade facilitation, anti-dumping measures,
intellectual property rights protection, among others). Furthermore, nontariff trade-related policy
changes induced by GATT/WTO may affect not only variable trade cost but also fixed trade cost.
For example, with Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, members are bound in setting product
safety standards and technical regulations. These constraints do not entail tariff reductions but
are very likely to have reduced fixed trade cost (for exporters to meet regulations/standards in
destination markets). As very much highlighted by Dutt et al. (2013), GATT/WTO works by
reducing primarily the fixed rather than the variable costs of trade. Focusing on tariffs alone will
thus omit a significant aspect of the GATT/WTO agreements. On the other hand, observed tariff
changes are not necessarily the outcome of GATT/WTO negotiations. For example, Baldwin (2016)
notes that some developing countries (such as China) have unilaterally lowered import tariffs in
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the 1990s, not due to GATT/WTO (before it became a member), but to attract inward FDI and
offshoring activities.
In view of the above arguments, we follow the empirical literature on the GATT/WTO trade
effects (e.g. Rose, 2004; Tomz et al., 2007; Subramanian and Wei, 2007; Chang and Lee, 2011) and
use the membership status (both in GATT/WTO, bothwto; only the importer in GATT/WTO,
imwto) as treatment indicators. As suggested by Cheong et al. (2014), one cannot separately
identify the effects of bothwto, imwto, and the exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects (FEs)
in a parametric framework, because these sets of indicator variables are multi-collinear. We thus
employ the nonparametric matching approach proposed by Chang and Lee (2011) that circumvents
this difficulty and also presents several advantages. In short, it can accommodate selection on
observables, heterogeneous treatment effects, heteroskedasticity, and arbitrary trade-cost functional
forms.
In line with many GATT/WTO scholars’ observations, we design the matching procedure to
allow the two treatment effects to vary across the development combinations of country pairs
(both developed countries, both developing countries, developing-developed exporting-importing
countries, and vice versa), and across time periods demarcated by eight GATT negotiation rounds.
Note that the estimated GATT/WTO effect at each given point in time represents the realized
(cumulative) extent of trade liberalization (in tariffs and all trade-related policy barriers) with the
presence of GATT/WTO (relative to the level of trade restriction if GATT/WTO had not existed).
We expect the extent of trade liberalization estimated to be larger over time, because the coverage
of the GATT/WTO trade agreements has broadened with each round of trade negotiation (Jackson,
1997), larger among developed members than developing members, and larger against developed
member exporters, because of the special and differential exemptions developing members have
received in the past trade negotiation process (Bagwell and Staiger, 2010, 2016).
We build on the literature of quantitative trade analysis, and construct the estimation framework
that incorporates three generations of trade models, the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) [AvW]
and the Eaton and Kortum (2002) [EK] model with perfect competition, the Krugman (1980)
model with firm entry, and the Melitz (2003) model with selection into export. By shutting down
certain margins of adjustment, the generic framework reduces to one of the three representative
models. Unlike Arkolakis et al. (2012), these models do not imply the same welfare effects, for two
main reasons. First, this is not a comparison of status quo and autarky, but a comparison of status
quo and the world without GATT/WTO. The same estimated trade effects given by the matching
procedure (regardless of models) map into a combined change in the variable and fixed trade costs
in the Melitz-type model, while only a change in the variable trade cost in the other models. This
has non-trivial implications on the ranking of trade models in their welfare predictions. Second,
contrary to the original models, we allow for the use of intermediates in production and also in
firm entry. The latter introduces non-equivalence across perfectly and monopolistically competitive
models as is also noted by Arkolakis et al. (2012). Note that in these exercises, the welfare gain
cannot be calculated directly using the formula of Arkolakis et al. (2012), because the counterfactual
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is not autarky but a world without GATT/WTO. The counterfactual changes in the key variables
of interest need to be simulated, taking into account general equilibrium adjustments to the trade
shocks across all countries.
Our work is closely related to Caliendo et al. (2017). They analyze the welfare effects of
observed MFN (and preferential) tariff changes between 1990 and 2010, using a Melitz framework
with multi-sectors and input-output linkages. As argued above, we think that MFN tariff changes
are only a fraction of what GATT/WTO has accomplished, especially in the era of 1990–2010
when the Uruguay Round has successfully included many agreements on nontariff trade-related
policies. By focusing on 1990–2010, it may also create a misperception that developing countries
have undertaken more trade liberalization under GATT/WTO. The fact is however that by 1990,
developed countries have reduced tariffs to very low levels, and not much scope was left for them
to further liberalize in terms of tariffs. Thus, without better information on the tariff structure
across countries at the beginning of GATT, quantitative exercises based on tariffs in recent decades
are better interpreted as the effects of tariff changes per se, and not representing the GATT/WTO
effect.
Two caveats are in order. First, as argued above, the membership indicators (bothwto, imwto)
allow us to capture changes in trade-related policies induced by GATT/WTO including both trade
costs and tariffs. Our estimation framework will also allow these GATT/WTO-induced policy
changes to affect both the fixed and variable trade costs. Without complete information on tariffs
for the whole period of study 1950–2015, however, it is difficult to decompose the estimated effects
into trade costs and tariffs. Thus, we do not attempt to explicitly account for the revenue effects
of tariffs and its impacts on firm behaviors. Notwithstanding, the effects of tariffs on prices are
taken into account, as for trade costs. As noted earlier, data on tariffs are characterized with
many missing entries (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). There also exists the complication due
to specific tariffs that must be converted to ad valorem equivalents by using the price information,
which in turn has its own measurement and concordance problem. See, however, the tremendous
efforts by Caliendo et al. (2017) to compile such tariff data dating back to 1984.1
Second, to account for multiple sectors and input-output (IO) linkages is another challenge when
the study period spans 1950–2015. This is due to the fact that most international comparable
IO tables are available only since 1990, although some regional tables date back to 1985 (such
as Japan IDE-JETRO input-output tables for ten Asian countries).2 National IO tables are in
general available only as early as 1990.3 Most time series on national IO tables are characterised
1Treating trade friction as solely trade cost and omitting the revenue effects of tariffs are done in many quantita-
tive trade models following Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003). This modeling choice is likely driven
also by the fact that tariff revenue is not a significant source of national income. According to OECD.Stat
(http://stats.oecd.org/), the share of tariff revenue in GDP in most countries is declining over the years and usually
below 2%. For example, in 1965, the share of tariff revenue in GDP for the US is 0.2%. The average for OECD,
Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa in 2000 are 0.3%, 1.9%, and 2.1%, respectively.
2The World Input-Output Database (WIOD) starts from 1995 for 27 EU countries and 13 non-EU countries. The
OECD Input-Output Tables (IOTs) include all OECD countries and 27 non-member economies for 1995–2011.
3The exceptions are Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, Netherlands, the UK, and the US, for which
the national IO tables are available as early as the 1970s.
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by temporal gaps and sectoral misalignment. The Eora project (Lenzen et al., 2013) provides the
most comprehensive international IO tables to date, with 187 countries for 1990–2015, and national
IO tables since 1970. The Eora national IO tables before 1990 are, however, imputed/constructed
based on automatic constrained optimization algorithms with more degrees of freedom (IO entries)
than constraints (data sources). The constructed national tables are also not harmonized across
countries, and vary in terms of types of classification and numbers of sectors/products, making them
difficult to use for cross-country studies. We thus decide to conduct the analysis based on aggregate
bilateral trade flows. We do, however, allow for the use of intermediates in production, and hence
input-output linkages in an aggregate sense. We may regard the welfare effects of GATT/WTO
presented in our paper as conservative lower-bound estimates, because adding multiple sectors and
IO linkages will amplify the welfare gains from trade as emphasized in Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare
(2015).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the Melitz framework
incorporating intermediates and trade imbalance, introduce the nonparametric estimation method-
ology, and set up the counterfactual structural equations. The AvW and Krugman models are
isomorphic to restricted versions of the Melitz framework. The estimation and counterfactual re-
sults are presented in Sections 3–4. Section 5 conducts extended analyses, and Section 6 concludes.
Proofs and further details on the data and simulation algorithms are provided in the appendix.
Without risk of confusion, we will often omit the year subscript in developing the models to sim-
plify the notations. But the year subscript will be explicitly included when we refer to estimation
specifications and measurement of variables.
2 The Structural Framework
We will motivate our estimation strategy and counterfactual analytical framework based on the
Melitz (2003) model with untruncated Pareto distribution, although equivalent sets of estimation
and counterfactual equations can be derived for the AvW and Krugman models (provided in the
appendix). Their mapping will be summarized in Section 2.3.
Let each country be characterized by the Melitz (2003) structure, but with possibly asymmetric
trade costs and country characteristics. Each country is endowed with a fixed supply of labor Li.
Buyers have CES preferences with an elasticity of substitution σ > 1 defined over the differentiated
varieties supplied by firms. Let ci denote the cost of an input bundle and Ni the mass of entrants
in country i. Each entrant pays a fixed cost of entry ciFi in order to take a productivity draw
1/a from a cumulative Pareto distribution Gi(a) over the support [0, a¯i] with dispersion parameter
θ > (σ − 1). Firms of productivity level 1/a located in country i incur a constant marginal cost
ciτija and a fixed cost cifij to serve country j, where τij indicates the variable trade cost factor
and fij the fixed trade cost in terms of input bundles.
4
4In robustness checks in Section 4.4, we will allow the entry to use input bundles that have different labor intensity
from the input bundles used in the production process. The modifications to the counterfactual equations are shown
in the Math Appendix.
5
Given CES preferences and monopolistic competition, firms in country i exit from serving
market j if its cost draw is above the cutoff aij defined by the zero-profit condition:
1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
ciτijaij
Pj
)1−σ
Ej = cifij , (1)
where Pj and Ej are the aggregate price index and the nominal expenditure of country j, respec-
tively. It follows that the exports of country i to country j is Xij =
(
σ
σ−1
ciτij
Pj
)1−σ
EjNiVij and
P 1−σj =
∑
i
(
σ
σ−1ciτij
)1−σ
NiVij , where
Vij ≡
∫ aij
0
a1−σdG(a) =
θ
θ − σ + 1
aθ−σ+1ij
a¯θi
(2)
indicates the proportion of firms (weighted by their market shares) that export from i to j.5
Let Yi denote the total sales of goods by country i to all destinations. Following the technique
used in the literature of structural gravity equation (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Anderson
and Yotov, 2010; Head and Mayer, 2015; Anderson and Yotov, 2016), we can derive a modified
gravity equation by imposing the market-clearing condition:
Yi =
∑
j
Xij =
(
σ
σ − 1ci
)1−σ
Ni
∑
j
(τij/Pj)
1−σ EjVij (3)
to solve for
(
σ
σ−1ci
)1−σ
Ni and substitute the result in the expression of Xij and Pj to obtain:
Xij =
YiEj
Yw
(
τij
ΠiPj
)1−σ
Vij , (4)
where
Π1−σi ≡
∑
j
(τij/Pj)
1−σVijej , (5)
P 1−σj =
∑
i
(τij/Πi)
1−σVijsi, (6)
Yw ≡
∑
i Yi indicates the world output, ej ≡ Ej/Yw the expenditure share of country j, and
si ≡ Yi/Yw the output share of country i. Equation (4) resembles the structural gravity equation,
and Πi and Pj in (5)–(6) the multilateral outward and inward multilateral resistance (MR) proposed
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), but with the extra term Vij indexing the extensive margin.
To arrive at an implementable estimation equation, note that the definitions of aij and Vij in (1)
5As in Melitz (2003), suitable conditions are imposed such that not all firms export.
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and (2) imply:
τ1−σij Vij =
(
τij
−θfij−
θ
σ−1+1
)(
Pj
θ−σ+1
)(
ci
− σθ
σ−1+σ
)(
Ej
θ
σ−1−1
)
. (7)
Using (7), we can rewrite the trade flow equation (4) and the MR equations (5)–(6) in terms of
variable and fixed trade costs as:
Xij =
YiEj
Yw
(
τij
−θfij−
θ
σ−1+1
χi ζj
)
, (8)
where6
χi ≡
∑
j
(τij
−θfij−
θ
σ−1+1/ζj)ej , (9)
ζj =
∑
i
(τij
−θfij−
θ
σ−1+1/χi)si. (10)
We may regard χi as the market access potential of exporter i, defined as the weighted average of
its access to each market weighted by the destination market’s expenditure share (relative to the
world output). Similarly, ζj can be regarded as the sourcing potential of importer j, with each
bilateral sourcing relationship weighted by the source country’s supply share.
The aggregate budget constraint that allows for trade deficit requires that:
Ej = Yj +Dj , (11)
where Dj is the nominal trade deficit of country j. We assume that the input bundle combines
labor and intermediate inputs with a constant labor share βi. Intermediates comprise the full set
of goods as for final demand, aggregated using the same CES function. This implies that the cost
of an input bundle in country i is
ci = w
βi
i P
1−βi
i . (12)
Under untruncated Pareto distribution, the aggregate profit is a constant share σ−1σθ of sales revenue.
Thus, free-entry condition requires that:
σ − 1
σθ
Yi = NiFici, (13)
where the aggregate profit equals the total entry cost. Finally, the labor-market clearing condition
requires that:
wiLi = βi
(
1− σ − 1
σθ
+
σ − 1
σθ
)
Yi, (14)
where βi
(
1− σ−1σθ
)
Yi is the part of labor cost incurred by firms in the production process and
6Specifically, χi ≡ Π1−σi /ci−
σθ
σ−1+σ and ζj ≡ P−θj /Ej
θ
σ−1−1.
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βi
(
σ−1
σθ
)
Yi the part incurred in the entry process.
2.1 Identification of the GATT/WTO Trade Effect
Introduce year subscript t in view of the panel data to be used. Define bothwtoijt as an indicator
that equals one if both countries i and j are GATT/WTO members in year t and zero otherwise.
Similarly, define imwtoijt as an indicator that equals one if only the importer j is a GATT/WTO
member in year t and zero otherwise. When a country becomes a GATT/WTO member, the coun-
try is required to apply the tariff-bindings and nontariff commitments negotiated in its accession
package or in general trade negotiation sessions by the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle to all
other members. This is expected to lower the variable/fixed trade costs for exports from member i
to member j. In contrast, members are not obligated by GATT/WTO to extend the same MFN
treatment to nonmembers. It is ex ante possible that the trade policy of members may become
liberalized against nonmembers (if they extend MFN treatment to nonmembers) or more restrictive
(if a member realigns its optimal tariffs against nonmembers). As a whole, we expect bothwto to
have a larger trade-promoting effect than imwto.7
Typically, the literature assumes that the unobserved variable/fixed trade cost is log-linear in
a vector of trade-cost proxies Zijt, and uses exporter-year and importer-year FEs to control for the
multilateral terms (χit and ζjt). The gravity equation (8) is then estimated using either an OLS
regression in its log transformation or a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation
in levels (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Unfortunately, this approach is not appropriate in the current
application, because we cannot estimate the standard set of exporter-year and importer-year FEs,
the effect of bothwto, and the effect of imwto all in the same regression. As shown by Cheong et al.
(2014), these indicator variables are multi-collinear.
Alternatively, we may consider normalizing the trade flows across four countries (eg.,
Xhit/Xhjt
Xkit/Xkjt
)
to eliminate the exporter-year and importer-year FEs as suggested by Head et al. (2010), and
taking a corresponding transformation of the trade-cost proxies Zijt. This approach still does not
solve the multi-collinearity problem discussed above, because the transformed bothwto and imwto
variables are co-linear with each other. Specifically, define z†ijhk,t ≡ (zhit− zhjt)− (zkit− zkjt) for a
trade-cost proxy variable z.8 Then, it can be shown that bothwto†ijhk,t = −imwto†ijhk,t.
Finally, some studies have chosen to dismiss imwto from the list of control. This avoids the
multi-collinearity problem, but will lead to biased estimates of the bothwto effect if members do
change their trade policy against nonmembers (since in this specification, the control group includes
country pairs where neither country is a member and country pairs where only the importer is a
member). As shown in Section 3, the effect of imwto is indeed statistically significant.
As a solution, we adopt the nonparametric matching method proposed by Chang and Lee (2011).
7Note that imwtoijt is not designed to capture general-equilibrium trade diversion effects, as these effects would
be controlled for by the multilateral terms χit and ζjt. Instead, imwtoijt is used to identify any direct changes in
trade cost for exports from a nonmember to a member, due to reasons discussed above.
8The notation z represents the log of a continuous trade-cost proxy variable Z (e.g., distance) or a discrete
trade-cost proxy variable (e.g., bothwto).
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The original paper provides more methodological expositions on the robustness/advantages of the
matching estimator. Here, we briefly summarize its main procedure. First, write the gravity
equation (8) in its log transformation:
lnXijt = lnYit + lnEjt + ln
(
τijt
−θfijt−
θ
σ−1+1
)
− ln (χit ζjt)− lnYwt. (15)
Assume that the variable and fixed trade costs each depend on the set of trade-cost proxies we have
identified. This will allow us to write:
ln
(
τijt
−θfijt−
θ
σ−1+1
)
= h(bothwtoijt, imwtoijt,Zijt). (16)
To estimate the bothwto effect, we take the observations where bothwtoijt = 1 as the treatment
group, and the observations where neither country is a member as the control group. For each
treated observation, we find the best match from the control group in terms of all the observable
characteristics (lnYit, lnEjt,Zijt, ln (χit ζjt) , Tt), where Tt are year dummies used to control for
lnYwt and any other year-specific shocks.
9 In implementation, including year dummies effectively
means that most matched observations will be from the same year; alternatively, we can directly
restrict the matching to observations from the same year. The multilateral terms, ln (χit ζjt), are ap-
proximated by the supply/expenditure-share weighted trade-cost proxies a` la Baier and Bergstrand
(2009). We will elaborate further on the construction of this measure below. The difference in
the trade flows lnXijt between the matched treated and untreated observations is then attributed
to the bothwto status, given that the treated and untreated country pairs are similar in all other
aspects. The average of the effects across the matched pairs is taken as the mean treatment effect
of bothwto on the treated; in other words, this is the ex-post effect for those observations that are
observed treated. The procedure to estimate the imwto effect is analogous but with the treatment
group now comprised of observations where imwtoijt = 1.
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This nonparametric approach has several advantages. First, the matching estimator circum-
vents the multi-collinearity problem at hand. This is the case because in each matching exercise,
by design, only one group of observations (bothwtoijt = 1 or imwtoijt = 1) is used as the treatment
group; they are not included in the analysis at the same time. Second, the matching estimator
9As in Chang and Lee (2011), we use the simple scale-normalized distance measure, (wijt − wi′j′t′)Σ−1w (wijt −
wi′j′t′)
′, where ijt is a treated observation, i′j′t′ a potential control subject, and Σw a diagonal matrix containing
the sample variances of the covariates w (i.e., the vector of the observable characteristics to be matched) on the
diagonal. As w includes continuous variables such as log of distance, the likelihood of multiple-matching (multiple
control subjects with the same distance to the treated subject) is negligible; thus, we restrict our attention to pair-
matching (where each subject has a unique closest match). In parallel with the restricted matching within year and
development combination to be discussed below, the sample variances of the covariates w are calculated specific to
the year and development combination.
10There remains the concern of selection on unobservables. In other words, the identification relies on the assump-
tion that there are no unobservable variables that affect the trade flow and also the likelihood of being treated in a
systematic way. Given that we use exactly the same set of controls as in a typical parametric regression approach in
this literature, this identification assumption is no more restrictive than the identification assumption of no omitted
variables in the parametric approach. In Chang and Lee (2011), the Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis was
conducted to show that the positive matching estimates of the GATT/WTO membership effect (on the treated) are
robust to selection on unobservables.
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is arguably more robust to mis-specification bias than the parametric approach. In particular, it
does not impose a particular functional form on the trade cost function h(·), but allows the trade
cost to depend on the observable proxies in arbitrary ways. This is useful, because although the
gravity equation has clear theoretical foundations, it is not obvious how the trade cost depends
on observable proxies. The log-linear functional form assumption on h(·) made in the literature
can be regarded as a convenient approximation but not a theoretical mandate. Third, selection
on observables is not a problem in the matching framework, because the treatment effect is es-
timated conditional on matched observations with similar observable characteristics and hence
similar probabilities of selection into treatment. Fourth and relatedly, the matching estimator can
accommodate heterogeneous treatment effects or heteroskedasticity concerns in a natural way. Be-
cause the matching is conditional on the observable characteristics, the effect (and its variance) is
in principle allowed to vary across matched pairs of different observable characteristics. The subset
of matched pairs used to calculate the mean treatment effect can be chosen based on economic the-
ories or a priori judgement. For example, the GATT/WTO effects could potentially differ across
development combinations of the country pairs and across trade negotiation rounds. The matching
can be conducted by restricting the match to the subset of observations with the same development
combination and/or within the same period. The mean effect can then be calculated conditional
on the development stage and/or the period. Restricted matching also helps reduce the concern of
selection on unobservables, to the extent that such unobservables are correlated with the restric-
tion criteria. We will elaborate further on how we refine the matching procedure to accommodate
heterogeneous effects of bothwto and imwto in Section 3 when we present the estimation results.
To reduce the concern of omitted variable bias or selection on unobservables, we use an extensive
set of controls as would be used in a typical parametric regression approach in this literature. First,
it includes the gross output of the exporter lnYit, the aggregate expenditure of the importer lnEjt,
and the year dummies Tt. Next, the list of trade-cost proxies Zijt include time-variant variables
(indicator for use of common currency, indicator for preferential trade agreements, indicator for
whether importer j offers GSP preferential treatment to exporter i, indicator for whether exporter i
is currently a colonizer of importer j, and indicator for whether importer j is currently a colonizer of
exporter i); and time-invariant variables (bilateral distance, common language indicator, common
legal origin indicator, indicator for whether two countries were/are the same state or the same
administrative entity, common border indicator, common colonizer indicator, indicator for whether
exporter i has ever been a colonizer of importer j, indicator for whether importer j has ever been
a colonizer of exporter i, the number of landlocked countries in a pair, and the number of island
countries in a pair). Note that wherever applicable, trade-cost proxies are allowed to be asymmetric,
specific to the direction of trade flows. This is in line with the theoretical setup of asymmetric trade
costs.
Third, we adopt the approach proposed by Baier and Bergstrand (2009) to approximate the mul-
tilateral terms (χit ζjt) by a first-order Taylor-series expansion. As shown in the appendix, ln(χit ζjt)
in (8) can be approximated by:
∑
k ek ln(τikt
−θfikt−
θ
σ−1+1) +
∑
m sm ln(τmjt
−θfmjt−
θ
σ−1+1)
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−∑m∑k smek ln(τmkt−θfmkt− θσ−1+1), which is the average (inverse measure of) variable/fixed
trade costs of the exporter and that of the importer relative to the world benchmark. This
translates into a B&B-approximated multilateral term z˜ for each of the trade-cost proxies z ∈
{bothwto, imwto,Z} under the log-linear approximation for the trade cost function, where z˜ijt ≡∑
k ekzikt +
∑
m smzmjt −
∑
m
∑
k smekzmkt. For example, in addition to ‘distance’ as a control,
the ‘B&B-distance’ is also included as a control, where ‘B&B-distance’ corresponds to the weighted
average distance of the exporter to the world and that of the importer to the world, net of the
weighted average distance of all country pairs in the world. Similar B&B terms are constructed for
the other trade-cost proxies.11
Three remarks are in order. First, the theoretical multilateral terms in (9) and (10) depend
on internal trade cost. This carries over to the B&B approximation formula. To account for this,
we assume that internal trade cost depends on a subset of the trade-cost proxies listed above that
are well defined for internal trade. These include: distance, common language indicator, common
legal origin indicator, same country indicator, and common currency. Thus, in constructing z˜ijt,
the summation (
∑
k,
∑
m, and
∑
m
∑
k) includes observations where k = i and m = j for this
subset of trade-cost proxies, but otherwise not. We also experiment with alternative specifications
of internal trade cost (eg., let τiit
−θfiit−
θ
σ−1+1 = 1 or let it depend on internal distance only). The
results turn out not to be sensitive to the specification of internal trade cost. Second, the B&B-
multilateral terms are subject to measurement errors due to log-linear approximation. There are,
however, no better ways to control for the multilateral terms in the matching framework to the best
of our knowledge. Note that it is not feasible to control for the multilateral terms using exporter-
year and importer-year indicators as is done in the parametric approach, because each observation
corresponds to a unique pair of exporter-year and importer-year; match cannot be formed based
on these two sets of indicator variables. Third, in principle, the matching procedure discussed
above can be carried out in terms of levels based on equation (8) rather than in terms of its log
transformation (15). We proceed with the latter alternative, because this will allow us to interpret
the estimates of bothwto and imwto as their effects on ln
(
τijt
−θfijt−
θ
σ−1+1
)
, and exponential of
these estimates as the ratio of (inverse measure of) trade costs with and without GATT/WTO.
This is useful, as our counterfactual analysis in Section 2.2 will be based on effects expressed in
terms of ratios of a variable under alternative scenarios, rather than in terms of level differences.12
11Note that the B&B setup specifically allows for asymmetric trade costs, although the Taylor-series expansion is
“centered” around a world with symmetric trade frictions. In our proof for a similar setup as in B&B (based on
AvW), our derivations are based on Taylor-series expansion centered around the origin (corresponding to no trade
frictions). The analogy is then used in the proof for the Melitz setup.
12By using only positive trade flows, the effect estimates are likely downward biased due to truncation at zero trade,
but this does not pose threat to our conclusion of positive GATT/WTO effects. On the other hand, since in the
matching framework, and in the permutation test we are using to compute statistical significance, heteroskedasticity
is accommodated, it is less clear whether the matching estimate is still subject to the heteroskedasticity critique of
Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
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2.2 Counterfactual Analysis
Given the estimates of the direct effects of bothwto and imwto on variable/fixed trade costs, we can
calculate how the change in trade cost due to GATT/WTO affects the endogenous variables in the
economy taking into account general equilibrium adjustment. To proceed, we rewrite the system of
structural equations in terms of changes a` la the hat algebra of Dekle et al. (2007). In particular,
let x′ denote the counterfactual value of a variable x and x̂ ≡ x′/x the ratio of the counterfactual
to the factual value of the variable.
Dividing both sides of (3) by Yw, the market-clearing condition implies the following:
ŝi = N̂i ĉ
1−σ
i Π̂
1−σ
i . (17)
The MR structural relationship (5)–(6) and the trade flow equation (4) imply that:
Π̂1−σi =
∑
j
αij
(
τ̂1−σij V̂ij/P̂
1−σ
j
)
êj , (18)
P̂ 1−σj =
∑
i
λij
(
τ̂1−σij V̂ij/Π̂
1−σ
i
)
ŝi, (19)
where αij ≡ Xij/Yi is the share of country i’s sales that goes to destination j and λij ≡ Xij/Ej is
the share of country j’s expenditure that is spent on source i. In static trade models, there are no
clear ways to deal with trade deficits in the counterfactual. We follow Caliendo and Parro (2015)
and assume that in the counterfactual, a country’s trade deficit as a share of world production
remains constant: D′i/Y
′
w = Di/Yw = δi. This, together with the aggregate budget constraint (11),
implies that
êi · ei = ŝi · si + δi, (20)
while by the definition of si, the following holds:
ŝi · si = Ŷi · Yi∑
k Ŷk · Yk
. (21)
Next, the Cobb-Douglas cost structure (12) for the input bundle requires that:
ĉi = ŵ
βi
i P̂
1−βi
i , (22)
and the free-entry condition (13) implies that:
Ŷi = N̂iĉi. (23)
Finally, by the labor market-clearing condition (14), we have
Ŷi = ŵi. (24)
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To close the model, note that given (7) we have:
τ̂1−σij V̂ij =
(
τ̂ij
−θf̂ij−
θ
σ−1+1
)(
P̂j
θ−σ+1
)(
ĉi
− σθ
σ−1+σ
)(
Êj
θ
σ−1−1
)
, (25)
where by definition
Êi =
Yi
Ei
Ŷi +
Di
Ei
Ŷw, (26)
and Ŷw =
∑
i siŶi.
Thus, using (17)–(26), we can solve for
{
ĉi, N̂i, Π̂i, P̂i, ŝi, êi, ŵi, Ŷi, Êi, τ̂
1−σ
ij V̂ij
}
for i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
given exogenous shocks in
{
τ̂ij
−θf̂ij−
θ
σ−1+1
}
, observable variables {αij , λij , ei, si, δi, Yi} and param-
eter values {1− σ, θ, βi}. The welfare effects of given exogenous changes in trade cost can then be
measured by:
Ŵ1,i = ŵi/P̂i. (27)
This formula evaluates the welfare effect based on changes in the real output, which in general
could differ from the real expenditure given the presence of trade deficit. Thus, we also consider
the welfare effect based on: Ŵ2,i = Êi/P̂i. Finally, the general equilibrium trade effect is given by:
X̂ij =
τ̂1−σij V̂ij
Π̂1−σi P̂
1−σ
j
ŝi Êj . (28)
To illustrate the algorithm, suppose the matching effect estimates of bothwto and imwto are
γ1 and γ2 respectively (ignoring heterogeneous effects for now to simplify notations). This implies
an ex-post effect of
{
τ̂ijt
−θf̂ijt−
θ
σ−1+1
}
= exp(γ1) for country pairs that are both GATT/WTO
members, and
{
τ̂ijt
−θf̂ijt−
θ
σ−1+1
}
= exp(γ2) for country pairs where only the importer is a mem-
ber. By introducing heterogeneous effect estimates of (γ1, γ2),
{
τ̂ijt
−θf̂ijt−
θ
σ−1+1
}
can be imputed
similarly for all country pairs and years under study that vary by development combinations and
time periods demarcated by negotiation rounds. These information on
{
τ̂ijt
−θf̂ijt−
θ
σ−1+1
}
can then
be fed into the system (17)–(26) to derive the ex-post effects of GATT/WTO on the welfare (27)
and the trade flows (28).
For the parameter values, we choose as the benchmark σ = 5, which lies within the range of trade
elasticity often reported in the gravity literature; see Head and Mayer (2015) for a meta-analysis.
For {βi}, we use the share of value added in gross output in country i, calculated as the median of
the value-added shares across sectors obtained from Caliendo and Parro (2015). The value varies
in the range of [0.37, 0.53] across countries.13 For the parameter θ, we choose the value based on
the estimate of θ− (σ− 1) from Helpman et al. (2004). Most of their estimates fall in the range of
[0.5, 1.5]. We adopt θ− (σ−1) = 1 as the benchmark value; i.e., θ = 5 when σ = 5. We will provide
13The shares of value added (in gross output) are fairly constant over time, based on the OECD Input-Output
Database and the IDE-JETRO Asian Input-Output Tables in years/countries available. Thus, we choose to use the
1993 value added shares from Caliendo and Parro (2015).
13
robustness checks for alternative parameter values, where σ = 10 or θ − (σ − 1) = {0.5, 1.5}.14
Further details on the algorithm are provided in the appendix.
In the data, a country does not trade with every potential trading partner. Such trading
relationships will be reflected by αijt = 0 and λijt = 0. All counterfactual changes in the trade
costs calculated for these country pairs based on the matching estimates will be multiplied by
zero shares and hence not affect the counterfactual results. In a sense, this is comforting, since
the current framework (as well as the alternative AvW and Krugman models) cannot explain
zero trade and counterfactual changes in the occurrence of zero trade; it is best to leave out
zero-trade relationships from the analysis. Thus, whatever counterfactual effects we obtain using
these frameworks are conditional on the positive trading relationships. This also suggests that the
matching estimates we obtain based on positive trade flows are consistent with the design of the
counterfactual analysis.
2.3 Alternative Framework: AvW, EK, and Krugman
As one of the robustness checks, we will document how the quantitative effects vary across the
underlying trade models, in particular, the AvW/EK model, the Krugman model, and the Melitz
model. These models represent the three generations of trade models, where the margin of firm
entry and the margin of selection into export are introduced by the second and the third model,
respectively. As shown in the appendix, the estimation and counterfactual analytical framework
that we have developed for the Melitz model can be applied to the AvW/EK and Krugman models
by shutting down the relevant margins of adjustment. First, the counterfactual analysis of the
AvW framework is isomorphic to the Melitz framework under the restrictions: (i) N̂i = 1, (ii)
V̂ij = 1, and (iii) dropping equations (23) and (25). Next, the counterfactual analysis of the
Krugman framework is equivalent to the Melitz framework under the restrictions: (i) V̂ij = 1, and
(ii) dropping equation (25). Thus, the Krugman model shuts down the extensive margin, while the
AvW framework further shuts down the firm entry margin.
Provided that the variable trade cost and the fixed trade cost depend on the same set of trade-
cost proxies we have identified, this will imply the same set of primitive controls and also the same
set of B&B controls in the three frameworks. Given the parallel trade flow equations (8) and (31),
it follows that we will obtain the same matching effect estimates of bothwto and imwto in the three
frameworks, since the set of controls are common.15
14Alternative values of θ˜ ≡ θ/(σ − 1) are suggested by Eaton et al. (2011), where they study the export behavior
of French firms in a modified Melitz framework. Based on Figure 3B therein, the regression slope of −0.66 (between
mean sales in France and entry into multiple countries) implies θ˜ ≈ 1.51. If based on Figure 3C instead, the regression
coefficient of −0.57 (between mean sales in France and entry into more difficult markets) implies θ˜ ≈ 1.75. Their
SMM estimate based on all the data suggests θ˜ = 2.46. Based on the US firm data, Chaney (2008) uses similar
methodology as Helpman et al. (2004) of regressing the log of firm rank on the log of firm sales, and estimates θ˜ ≈ 2.
In Eaton et al. (2013), however, they find that simulations with σ = 5.64 and θ˜ = 1.05 match most closely the data
and can explain the fact that a small number of French firms account for a large share of total exports. This set of
parameter values imply θ = 4.87 and are close to the benchmark values we adopt for the counterfactual simulations
(σ = 5 and θ = 5).
15This point is obvious if we abstract from the multi-collinearity problem and see it from the perspective of the
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In spite of the same matching effect estimates, they take on different structural interpretations
across the frameworks: these estimates reflect the effect of bothwto and imwto on only the variable
trade cost in the AvW (Krugman) framework and their effects on the intensive margin of trade.
In contrast, they reflect the GATT/WTO effect on both the variable and fixed trade costs in the
Melitz framework, and in turn, their combined effects on the intensive and extensive margins of
exports.
Although not explicitly shown, the EK setup is isomorphic to AvW; they imply the same set of
structural gravity equations and welfare effects, as suggested by Arkolakis et al. (2012) and Head
and Mayer (2015). The taste parameter b1−σi in AvW corresponds to the technology parameter Ti
in EK, while the partial trade elasticity σ − 1 in AvW is equivalent to the supply-side efficiency
dispersion parameter θ in EK.
It is useful to highlight that the entry effects arise in our framework because fixed costs and
entry costs are assumed to use input bundles (combining labor and intermediate inputs) instead
of labor alone. This introduces an extra margin of adjustment in firm entry not present in trade
models of perfect competition. It can be shown that N̂i =
(
ŵi/P̂i
)1−βi
using (22), (23), and (24).
Thus, without intermediates (βi = 1), the number of firms will remain constant as in the original
models of Krugman and Melitz. Without intermediates in fixed cost, the Krugman model will also
be isomorphic to AvW and EK in terms of welfare effects (see also Arkolakis et al., 2012, p. 115).16
3 Matching Results
As discussed in the introduction, the GATT/WTO membership effects identified by our matching
procedures capture the realized (cumulative) extent of trade liberalization with the presence of
GATT/WTO at each given point in time (relative to the level of trade restriction if GATT/WTO
had not existed). Thus, we expect the bothwto effect to increase in magnitudes over the years as the
GATT/WTO agreements increase in their depths and coverage. Similarly, we expect the bothwto
effect to be stronger for developed members, as at each point in time, developed member countries
have accumulated larger extents of liberalization than developing members since the beginning of
GATT/WTO. We document these heterogenous patterns of trade liberalization below.
In its history (1947–1994), GATT has sponsored eight rounds of trade negotiations (World
Trade Organization, 2007; Bagwell et al., 2016). Its initial treaty, GATT 1947, specifies the general
obligations of members in setting tariffs and nontariff policies. The first five rounds of negotia-
tions were participated by a relatively small number (23 to 38) of countries. The sixth round, the
parametric approach. Suppose the set of trade-cost proxies included to control for the variable trade cost is the same
as those for the fixed trade cost. Then, after controlling for the exporter-year and importer-year FEs, the remaining
variations in the trade flows are the same in both (8) and (31). Regression of the remaining variations on the same
set of controls will thus yield the same coefficient estimate across the two equations for each of the trade-cost proxies.
In general, the exclusion restriction that a variable affects only the fixed (but not the variable) trade cost is hard to
find and often sensitive to the sample studied.
16In Caliendo et al. (2017), fixed cost and entry use labor alone (which implies zero entry effects in one-sector
models); the entry effects in their model are thus driven by sectoral linkages and tariff revenues.
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Kennedy Round (1964–67), saw a larger number (62) of participants. In addition to cutting tariffs,
the Kennedy Round strengthened the discipline on anti-dumping measures (by interpreting Arti-
cle 6 of GATT 1947). It also recognized the special need of developing countries, which henceforth
encouraged the participation of developing countries in GATT. The Tokyo Round (1973–1979),
with an even larger number (102) of participants, continued the GATT’s tradition of cutting im-
port tariffs. Most importantly, it embarked on negotiations in a wide range of nontariff measures,
including technical barriers to trade, import licensing procedures, government procurement, cus-
toms valuation, anti-dumping measures and subsidies and countervailing measures. Participated
by 123 countries, the Uruguay Round (1986–94) succeeded in lowering the general import tariffs
further by 30+ percent and reached several new agreements on nontariff measures, including all
issues addressed under the Tokyo Round but also new areas such as trade in services, intellectual
property rights, and trade-related investment measures. Trade that used to be exempted from the
GATT rules such as trade in textiles, clothing, and agriculture, are also subject to stricter rules.
Importantly, the GATT dispute settlement procedure was overhauled, and under the new WTO
procedure, members are subject to stronger enforcement mechanism (Chang, 2009). As a result of
these eight negotiation rounds, the average ad valorem tariffs on industrial goods have fallen from
over 40% to below 4%, and members are subject to increasingly greater disciplines on trade-related
nontariff measures and domestic policies.
Next, as documented by Jackson (1997) and many others, developing members have not under-
taken as deep and extensive trade liberalization as industrialized countries in the history of GATT.
For example, many developing countries joined GATT through the sponsorship by their colonizer
after becoming independent; they were accepted into GATT without negotiating a tariff concession
schedule or with very brief ones. Many agreements also gave explicit or implicit special and differ-
ential treatment to the developing countries. For example, despite nominal prohibitions in GATT
against quantitative restrictions, developing countries may implement such measures for balance
of payment purposes. Thus, we expect smaller trade impact of membership for developing than
developed countries. Further, the aggregate trade impact is likely larger on imports from developed
members than developing members, even if the trade policy concessions of members are applied
on a MFN basis (Bagwell and Staiger, 2010, 2016). We could expect this to occur in practice if
developed members focus their negotiation efforts on sectors of their comparative advantages. The
work by Subramanian and Wei (2007) suggests that such heterogeneous membership effects are
indeed observed in the data. Although with the Uruguay Round negotiations, the developing coun-
tries are subject to greater disciplines under WTO, they are often given longer phase-in periods to
implement new trade agreements.17
Let H indicate developed and L developing countries. Let country pairs be classified according
17Although developing countries have reduced tariffs by more during the period of 1990–2010, it remains the case
that the extent of tariff reduction since 1947 is smaller in developing countries compared to developed countries.
Besides, the membership effects identified in the paper include trade-related policy changes in addition to tariffs. The
finding that the degree of trade liberalization is much larger among developed members than developing members is
consistent with many documented observations that developed countries have liberalized by larger extents in most
aspects since the beginning of GATT in 1947.
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to their development combinations. For example, LH indicates developing exporter and developed
importer country pairs, and HL developed exporter and developing importer country pairs; sim-
ilarly, HH and LL represent developed and developing pairs. We explain in the data appendix
how we define development stages, and report the frequency of developed/developing and mem-
ber/nonmember countries across years in Tables 1–2.
We implement the matching procedure described in Section 2.1, allowing for heterogeneous
treatment effects. In particular, in addition to the matching controls listed in Section 2.1, we
further restrict the matching to observations within the same year and development combinations.
We then calculate the mean treatment effect of bothwto or imwto specific to each development
combination and time period demarcated by the trade negotiation rounds. The restricted matching
has the added benefit of reducing the concern of selection on unobservables, if such unobservables
are systematically related to the development stages (or years) and also the trade volumes. Tables 3
and 4 report the results. The statistical significance of the estimates and their confidence intervals
are calculated based on permutation tests (Chang and Lee, 2011). The 40% caliper indicates
that given M1 treated observations (and matched pairs), only the matched pairs with the shortest
matching distance (less than the 40 percentile of all matches) are used in calculating the mean
treatment effects.18
Table 3 on the effect estimates of bothwto shows that the GATT/WTO membership has positive
effects on trade among members, but the effects are heterogeneous. In particular, the effects are
the largest among developed members and the weakest among the developing members (γ1,HH >
γ1,LL). The effects tend to be larger when the importing country is a developed member (γ1,HH >
γ1,HL and γ1,LH > γ1,LL). Further, the trade effects tend to be more pronounced on exports by
developed members than developing members (γ1,HH > γ1,LH). These results are in line with our
discussions above that developed members tend to liberalize more than developing members, and
such liberalization may be biased in composition in favor of developed countries’ exports. Across
rounds, we see generally increasing effects over time especially on imports by developed members
(γ1,HH and γ1,LH); the effect is especially strong following the Uruguay Round, reflecting the broad
coverage of its agreements. The exception is the trade among developing members (γ1,LL), whose
effect is weak and erratic across years.
Table 4 reports the corresponding imwto effect. Compare Table 3 and Table 4. We note that
the bothwto effects are, on average, bigger than the imwto effects (γ1 > γ2) for all development
combinations. The smaller effect of imwto relative to bothwto suggests that not all members extend
their MFN treatment to nonmembers, or that such extensions are not granted at all times or to
all nonmembers. The effect of imwto is on average positive if the member is developed and zero
to negative otherwise (γ2,HH , γ2,LH > 0, γ2,HL = 0 and γ2,LL < 0). This suggests that developed
members tend more likely to extend MFN treatment to imports from nonmembers. The negative
effect of γ2,LL indicates that developing members actually tend to raise their trade restriction
18Suppose M matches are formed. They could be ranked in terms of the closeness of the match. A x% caliper uses
(x% ·M) matched pairs that have a matching distance smaller than the x percentile of all M matches.
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against nonmember developing countries (especially in recent years).
4 General Equilibrium Welfare Effects
In this section, we present the main results on the welfare effects of GATT/WTO membership and
examine the sensitivity of the results to alternative structural trade models, the choice of parameter
values for trade elasticity, and matching estimates.
4.1 AvW Counterfactuals
We first conduct counterfactual analysis based on the AvW framework, where the shocks to the
trade cost across years (τ̂1−σijt for all ijt) are calculated based on the effect estimates of bothwto
and imwto from Tables 3 and 4 (that are statistically significant at the 10% level). To reiterate,
these shocks to bilateral trade costs due to GATT/WTO membership are heterogeneous across
the development combinations of the country pairs and the time periods demarcated by the eight
GATT negotiation rounds. Note that we have conducted the matching estimation only up to year
2005, but extend the counterfactual analysis to the period of 2006–2015 (using the matching effect
estimates of 1995–2005). This decision is made due to the concern that the set of nonmembers
(especially developed countries) have become very small in the period of 2006–2015; as a result,
the overlapping support assumption of matching estimation may be violated. Since most of the
Uruguay Round agreements are implemented by 2005 and not much progress has been made since
then in the Doha Round, we judge the trade effect estimates of 1995–2005 to reflect reasonably
well the extent of trade liberalization completed after the Uruguay Round.
Figure 1 provides a breakdown of the welfare effects by development stages and membership sta-
tus. Due to space constraints, we report the results for selected years. We see that the distribution
of welfare effects has become increasingly more dispersed with a long right tail. Developed members
in general have gained more relative to developing members. For example, in 2015, the mode is
+8% for developed members, but +2% for developing members. In early years, nonmembers tend
to gain from GATT/WTO by free-riding on members’ extension of MFN treatment. But such posi-
tive externality is limited and has generally disappeared since 1980. Their distribution, being more
compressed before 1980, starts to diverge from the member’s distribution and sees an increasing
welfare loss of being outside the GATT/WTO system. These heterogeneities in the GATT/WTO
welfare effects across countries are mainly driven by the heterogeneous partial effect estimates of
(γ1, γ2) across development combinations and rounds, but also by differences in country sizes and
the general equilibrium effects. In Section 4.5, we will showcase the diverse welfare effects for a
variety of countries.19
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the changes in the inward and outward multilateral resistance. We note
that the distribution of P̂j for members lies to the left of nonmembers’; in other words, members
19Although the set of countries included in the analysis vary across years because of data limitation (cf. Table 1),
the heterogenous pattern of welfare effects remains largely the same if we restrict the diagrams to include only the
set of countries available in 1960.
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tend to experience a larger drop (or a smaller increase) in inward multilateral resistance. The
structural relationship between {Πi} and {Pj} in (32)–(33) in the Appendix implies that Πi and
Pi tend to move in opposite directions. It is indeed found that the distribution of Π̂i for members
tends to be a rightward shift of nonmembers’. Although this moves the members’ nominal wage
less favorably than nonmembers’, the increase in the nominal wage in member countries tends
to dominate the increase in the aggregate price (if it does increase), and thus leads to positive
welfare gains. In comparison, the MFN treatment extended by some members helps lower the
nonmembers’ outward multilateral resistance and in turn raises the nominal wage of nonmembers.
But by not joining the system, trade diversion away from members leads to higher aggregate prices
in nonmember countries. Although the increase in the nominal wage tends to dominate the increase
in the aggregate price for nonmembers in the earlier decades (implying a welfare gain), the pattern
reverses in the later decades.
Figure 4 summarizes the general equilibrium effects of GATT/WTO on trade shares (measured
by the ratio of a country’s imports over expenditures). The distribution of the trade shares for
members is a clear rightward shift relative to the counterfactual without GATT/WTO, and the
effect is more pronounced in recent years. For example, in 2015, the mode of import shares is
12.5% for members while it would have been 2.5% in the counterfactual. Nonmembers do not see
a dramatic shift in their import shares (as these changes, if any, are a result of general equilibrium
effects). In recent years, however, their trade shares appear to have been negatively affected, by
being outside the system.
4.2 Krugman Counterfactuals
This section provides the counterfactual results based on the Krugman framework. As indicated
by Figure 5, the welfare effects of GATT/WTO are qualitatively similar to the AvW framework,
but the magnitudes of the gains (losses) are bigger. For example, in 2015, the mode of the welfare
gain for members is +11% for developed countries, but +3% for developing countries (in contrast
with 8% and 2% in AvW).
Recall that with the use of intermediates, the number of firms is not fixed in the Krugman
framework and this adjustment in firm entry introduces an extra margin of gains from trade relative
to the AvW framework. In addition, as discussed in Section 2.3, the adjustment in firm entry varies
with the gains in real income monotonically N̂i =
(
ŵi/P̂i
)1−βi
. Thus, the larger the initial gain
under the AvW framework, the stronger the amplification effect due to firm entry in the Krugman
model. These observations are confirmed by the changes in firm entry in Figure 6: the distribution
of the firm-entry effects follows closely that of the welfare effects shown in Figure 1.
4.3 Melitz Counterfactuals
We now turn to the Melitz framework. The results on welfare are summarized in Figure 7. The
patterns of the welfare effects for members and nonmembers across years are qualitatively similar
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to the first two frameworks. As suggested by Figure 8, the quantitative gains for members in the
Melitz framework turn out to be smaller than the Krugman framework. The ranking might first
appear surprising given the work of Melitz and Redding (2015), but in fact is consistent with the
current setup.
To see this, note that between the Krugman and Melitz models, they have the same equivalent
set of counterfactual equations, except the shocks to the MR equations. It is τ̂1−σij in (36)–(37) for
the Krugman model and τ̂1−σij V̂ij in (18)–(19) for the Melitz model. As discussed earlier, the same
set of matching estimates correspond to the GATT/WTO effect on the variable trade cost (τ̂1−σij )
in the Krugman model, but its effect on both the variable and fixed trade costs (τ̂ij
−θf̂ij−
θ
σ−1+1) in
the Melitz framework. Thus, given σ and θ, the estimates may map into different levels of changes
in the underlying trade cost across these two models. In fact, the larger θ is, the smaller the implied
changes in variable and fixed trade costs in the Melitz model for given set of effect estimates, and
intuitively, the smaller the welfare effects. It is clear from (25) that the Melitz numerical results
will converge to those of the Krugman model as θ approaches its lower bound σ − 1. Thus, for all
θ > σ − 1, the same set of observed trade flows would actually imply smaller welfare effects in the
Melitz than in the Krugman model. This is illustrated by Figure 8, which indicates smaller gains
for members and smaller losses for nonmembers in the Melitz framework relative to the Krugman
framework. The smaller welfare effects in the Melitz framework also imply correspondingly smaller
effects on firm entry, given the monotonic relationship between changes in firm entry and changes
in real wages.
Two remarks are in order. First, note that we infer the welfare effects given the observed
trade flows, which do not necessarily imply the same underlying trade cost in the two models. In
contrast, Melitz and Redding (2015) compare the two models’ welfare implications on the premise
of the same initial condition and the same change in trade cost. Second, we did not modify the
original Krugman model to introduce entry cost and fixed trade cost as is done in Melitz and
Redding (2015). These discrepancies in setups and economic structures help explain the current
finding in favor of the Krugman model.
We may also compare the AvW and Melitz models’ welfare implications. Note that because
the AvW model implies the same MR equations as the Krugman model, the same mechanism
discussed above would imply smaller welfare effects in the Melitz model. However, the extra
margin of adjustment in firm entry present in the Melitz model but not in the AvW model exerts
a countervailing effect. Thus, in general, it is not necessary that the effects would be bigger in the
Melitz framework. For the benchmark parameter values (σ = 5, θ = 5), we find that the firm entry
effect dominates, and as a result, the estimated welfare gains for members are bigger in the Melitz
model than in the AvW framework (cf. Figure 8).
When the parameter value for firm dispersion θ increases, the first mechanism becomes more
pronounced and simultaneously the entry effect becomes weaker. For example, as we increase θ
from the benchmark to 5.5, the welfare effects in the Melitz model are reduced, accompanied by
smaller changes in firm entry. These patterns are shown in Tables 5–7 and Table 10. As discussed
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below in Section 4.4, we also experiment with larger values of θ in robustness checks. It is shown
that with sufficiently large θ (eg., σ = 5 and θ = 8), the ranking will reverse such that the median
welfare gains are larger in the AvW model than the Melitz model.
4.4 Robustness Checks
In this section, we conduct several sensitivity analyses. We consider: using the real expenditure
as an alternative measure of welfare, raising the elasticity of substitution to an extreme high
value (σ = 10), varying firm dispersion parameter values (θ = {4.5, 5.5, 6, 8, 10}), using alternative
matching effect estimates based on 100% caliper, and allow alternative levels of labor intensity
in the entry process. The results are reported in Tables 5, 6 and 7, which give the median,
the 75-percentile, and the 25-percentile welfare effects of GATT/WTO, respectively. Although
not explicitly reported, the results are similar when based on the real expenditure as the welfare
measure.
First, we allow θ to vary within a range of values suggested by the literature (discussed in
Footnote 14). A higher θ is expected to lower the welfare effect estimates in the Melitz model
as the same observed changes in trade flows imply smaller changes in the underlying trade costs.
Indeed, across Tables 5–7, the welfare effects of the Melitz model monotonically decrease as we
increase θ from 4.5 to 10. In particular, when θ = 8, the Melitz model implies smaller welfare
effects than both the AvW and Krugman models. As discussed in Section 4.3, the extra welfare
gain due to firm entry in the Melitz model is in this scenario dominated by the smaller implied
trade cost changes, compared with the AvW model.
Next, we expect the welfare effects to reduce when σ is bigger since goods are closer substitutes.
In the Melitz model, we need to set the parameter θ > (σ− 1) such that the aggregate price is well
defined. Thus, by setting σ = 10, we also modify θ up to θ = 10. These parameter values are close
to the upper-bound numbers used in the literature, so we could take the associated welfare effects
under this setting as the lower-bound predictions. These welfare effects of GATT/WTO are shown
in Scenarios 7 and 14 in Tables 5–7.
Third, Tables 8 and 9 report the matching effect estimates based on the 100% caliper choice.
They are in general larger than based on the 40% caliper, albeit with some exceptions. Larger
matching effect estimates map into larger welfare effects. For example, Tables 5–7 show that the
welfare effects in Scenario 9 (with 100% caliper, σ = 5, θ = 5) are overall larger (in absolute
magnitudes) than the benchmark. This ranking also holds across variations in σ and θ.
Finally, we allow the entry process in the Melitz model to use input bundles that have higher
labor intensity than the input bundles used in the production process following Bollard et al. (2016)
[BKL] and Arkolakis et al. (2012). The modifications to the counterfactual equations are shown in
the Math Appendix. Let κ denote the value-added share in the entry process. The mean value-
added share across the entry and the production process is then: β¯i ≡ βi
(
1− σ−1σθ
)
+κ
(
σ−1
σθ
)
. The
value β¯i corresponds to the value-added share observed in the data. Since the maximum value-
added share observed across countries in the data is 0.53. We set κ to take on values in [0.6, 0.8, 1]
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and calibrate βi for given κ and observed β¯i. The effects on firm entry are summarized in Table 10,
where we also include the Melitz benchmark results (when κ = βi = β¯i). Consistent with theoretical
implications, the relatively larger increase in the wage relative to the aggregate price (for members)
implies a higher entry cost as κ increases, and hence weakens the incentive to entry. The reverse is
true for nonmembers when they experience a smaller increase in the wage relative to the aggregate
price; an increase in κ reduces the negative effect on entry. To the limit when κ = 1, the mass of
firms remains constant, as suggested by the original Melitz model. These findings remain to hold
regardless of variations in the parameter values for σ, θ, and the caliper choice.
In spite of the impacts on firm entry as κ changes, Table 11 indicates that the impact of varying
κ on welfare is negligible. To understand this result, note that we calibrate the parameter to imply
the same mean value-added share as observed in the data. As κ increases in the entry, for given
observed value-added share β¯i, it implies smaller βi in the production. A larger κ reduces the
welfare effects (via smaller firm entry effects), but a smaller βi amplifies it (as the multiplier effect
via the use of intermediates in production is stronger). The simulation results suggest that these
two countervailing effects exactly cancel out.
4.5 Country-specific Welfare Effects and Regional Impacts
In Figure 10, we illustrate the diverse welfare effects of GATT/WTO across countries. We choose
for each region (America, Asia, Europe/Africa/Middle East) six countries, of various development
stages, country sizes, and timings of GATT/WTO accession. We report the effects based on the
AvW and Krugman frameworks with parameter values σ = {5, 10}, representing the median and the
upper bound of elasticity estimates in the literature. Given the counterfactual results shown above,
the Melitz framework’s welfare implications generally lie in between the AvW and the Krugman
model. The timing of a country’s accession to GATT/WTO is indicated by a vertical red line.
Figure 10 shows that, among the big developed members, Germany (DEU) has benefited the
most, followed by the UK (GBR), Japan (JPN), and the US (USA). Developing members such as
India (IND) and Brazil (BRA) tend to gain relatively less, with Argentina (ARG) seeing a stronger
effect in recent years. Small open economies in particular benefit a lot from GATT/WTO. For
example, Singapore (SGP) has gained more than 50% (and up to 100%) in real GDP every year
since 1980 based on the Krugman framework. Denmark (DNK) has also experienced a steady large
welfare gain of 7–13% annually since its accession to the system.
Turning to the next set of countries that joined GATT/WTO relatively late or never, we see that
the welfare dynamics typically shows a dramatic shift following the accession. For example, China
(CHN) has seen a big annual welfare gain of up to 8% since its accession in 2001, in contrast with
small welfare losses during 1980–2000. The welfare gains following accession are more dramatic
for small open economies such as Thailand (THA) and Vietnam (VNM), while they are not as
pronounced for more closed economies such as Ecuador (ECU). Vietnam has benefited as much
as 20% and Thailand 15% annually since joining GATT/WTO in 2007 and 1982, respectively.
The welfare dynamics of Paraguay (PRY) is quite volatile, mimicking its volatile trajectory of
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trade openness. Nonmembers typically do not lose much from being outside the system before
1980 and mostly free-ride on the MFN liberalization of members, but such positive externality
generally disappeared after 1980. The welfare cost borne by these nonmembers since 1980 appears
to have prompted several of them to join GATT/WTO afterwards. Finally, the last three countries
(Belarus, Yemen, and Ethiopia) illustrate the welfare cost sustained by countries who have remained
nonmembers throughout most of the period (1950–2015). The welfare cost is as high as 25% for
Belarus (BLR) in 2012 in the aftermath of its currency crisis, and more than 10% for Yemen (YEM),
a relatively poor country. It is also increasingly costly for least developed African countries such as
Ethiopia (ETH) to stay outside the system, even though they are relatively closed to begin with.
Table 12 provides a summary of the impacts across geographical regions. We see that all OECD
countries have gained, and in 2015, the mean and median gains are substantial at 11–13% by the
Krugman framework. East and South Asia, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia have some very
big winners and some small losers, leaving an overall big positive welfare impact above 7%. Latin
American and Caribbean countries have experienced relatively homogeneous and positive welfare
effects, with a mean/median of 4–6%. The other regions have seen generally smaller positive effects
from GATT/WTO. Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, has very diverse experiences, reflecting its
rather heterogeneous economic structures and varying degrees of participation in world trade.
5 Extended Analysis
In this section, we use the frameworks that we have established to examine three interesting issues.
5.1 Interaction of PTA and GATT/WTO
First, the proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), especially since 1990s, has raised
concerns about whether PTAs will impede the progress and objectives of multilateral trade liber-
alizations under GATT/WTO. The tension and interaction between PTAs and GATT/WTO are
of two folds. On one hand, the presence of PTAs may alter the incentives to participate in mul-
tilateral trade liberalization or the extent of multilateral trade liberalization feasible (Levy, 1997;
Krishna, 1998; Karacaovali and Limao, 2008; Estevadeordal et al., 2008). We will not be able to
address this issue, as it requires a completely different structural model with endogenous trade-
policy formation. We leave this interesting quantitative evaluation to future work. On the other
hand, given the presence of the PTA network and the GATT/WTO membership status, the PTA
provisions may undermine or complement the multilateral trade policies. For example, Bagwell
et al. (2016) suggest many avenues where PTAs may worsen the terms-of-trade externality that
GATT/WTO multilateral approach hopes to eliminate. Nevertheless, when looking beyond the
terms-of-trade argument, the same survey (p. 1196–1206) suggests that PTAs could potentially ad-
dress issues that GATT/WTO’s shallow integration approach fails to, for example, in response to
the commitment problem (Ethier, 1998) or the complications introduced by production offshoring
(Antra`s and Staiger, 2012). We evaluate this second issue by conducting the welfare analysis of
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GATT/WTO in the counterfactual had all the PTAs not existed, and compare the effect with what
we have obtained in Section 4 under factual PTAs. We use the same matching procedure described
in Section 2.1 to estimate the PTA effect, with the treatment now replaced by the PTA indicator,
and with bothwto and imwto as part of the matching controls. As shown in Table 13, the PTA
trade effects are relatively homogeneous across development stages. In unreported analysis, we find
that the PTA effects are also similar across decades. In any case, most of the PTAs were signed
since 1990s. Thus, we proceed with the set of PTA effect estimates in Table 13 that differ across
development stages but not across time.20
Figure 9 summarizes the welfare effects of GATT/WTO without PTAs relative to its effects
with the observed PTAs. This is based on the AvW framework and benchmark parameter values.
We see that the ex-post gains of members are smaller without the PTAs. The difference becomes
more significant in recent decades when the PTAs surge in numbers (and also noticeable in 1960
during the first wave of PTAs). Thus, for GATT/WTO members, PTAs appear to complement
multilateral liberalization, supporting the view in Antra`s and Staiger (2012) that individualized
deep-integration PTAs may be required (alongside GATT/WTO) to guide governments to efficient
policy choices. As documented by Hofmann et al. (2017), PTAs on average have become deeper
since late 1990s in the sense that many of them include WTO-plus and WTO-extra provisions that
go beyond the GATT/WTO mandate. The results in Figure 9 provide some supporting evidence
on the potential complementarity between deep PTAs and GATT/WTO.
As shown in the previous sections, nonmembers sustain welfare losses (especially since 1980s)
by being outside the GATT/WTO system and disadvantaged in terms of market access. Figure 9
shows that the ex-post losses of nonmembers are bigger without the PTAs. In other words, welfare
losses of nonmembers are alleviated with access to PTAs. A closer look into the data suggests that
most nonmembers have signed some PTAs in recent years. In a way, this suggests that PTAs are
in general welfare-improving for nonmembers and that trade creation dominates potential trade
diversion of PTAs for these countries. However, this also implies that the relief offered by PTAs
may reduce nonmembers’ incentives to participate in GATT/WTO, related to the first aspect of the
debate discussed above. Thus, in this perspective, PTAs could be stumbling blocks to multilateral
trade liberalization.
5.2 Effect of GATT/WTO on Cross-country Income Disparity
In the second exercise, we analyze how cross-country income disparity has been affected by the
multilateral liberalization process introduced by GATT/WTO. Does the system tend to benefit
the poor countries more than the rich ones, and reduce the cross-country income disparity, or
20The estimates of bothwto and imwto in each cell of Tables 3 and 4 are the mean effects across treated observations
with or without PTAs. The estimates are very similar if we further restrict the sample to those without PTAs. It is,
however, difficult to implement the same estimation for only those observations with PTAs, because there are often
no or very few observations in the control group for the development combinations of HH, LH, and HL. In other
words, there are few observations where a country pair has PTAs but neither is a GATT/WTO member in these
development combinations.
24
has it worsened the global income disparity? To begin, we calculate the Gini coefficient of the
factual GDP per capita weighted by the population of each country.21 This is then compared to
the counterfactual Gini coefficient had GATT/WTO not existed, based on the AvW/Krugman
framework with σ = {5, 10}. Figure 11 presents the results. Since the set of countries in our
sample vary across years, we present four variations, where the set of countries include all those
available in each given year, or are fixed to those available across all years during 1980–2005 (118
countries) or during 1980–2015 (111 countries), respectively. The second set of results remove the
potential effects (on the Gini coefficient) of changes in the composition of countries across years.
For example, in panels (a) and (c), the spike in the Gini coefficient in 1961 and the discrete jump
in 1978 are due to the inclusion of China in the sample.
Figure 11 indicates that the global income disparity has increased during 1980–1995, but has
since gradually lowered toward its historically low level seen in 1958. The absolute level, however,
is still alarmingly high at above 0.6. This reversal in the trend of global income disparity in recent
decades is consistent with the findings documented by Milanovic (2016) and Bourguignon (2015).22
Next, we see that the global income disparity is higher without GATT/WTO after 1980 (the
results are similar based on AvW or Krugman, and actually not distinguishable). The difference
is especially large after 1995. These patterns suggest that GATT/WTO has in fact brought the
poor nations/people up the ladder of livelihood, improving the global equality across countries. In
particular, the integration of China (and other developing Asian countries) into the world economy
via GATT/WTO likely has contributed significantly to this trend.
As a final remark, the current paper has not addressed the question of whether GATT/WTO
has worsened the within-country income inequality, and if so, in what set of countries, through
what mechanisms, and to what extents. It would be interesting to answer these questions based on
quantitative trade/FDI models that allow for heterogeneous factors of production. We leave this
to future research.
21This is the second concept of inequality (Inequality 2 ) as classified by Milanovic (2013). The first concept of
inequality focuses on inequality between nations of the world, using GDPs per capita (or mean incomes obtained
from household surveys) of countries in the world, without population weighting. The concept Inequality 2 differs
from the first concept by taking into account countries’ population sizes. The third concept is the global inequality,
which focuses on individuals: each person, regardless of his or her country, enters in the calculation with their actual
income. Because the third concept relies on household surveys, which are not available for most countries before the
mid- or late 1980s, it cannot be calculated with much precision before then.
22Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) argue that the relative income across countries has remained stable between 1960
and 1990 as indicated by Figure I in their paper. This appears in tension with the pattern suggested by Figure 11,
where the global income disparity has increased from 1960 to 1990. Even if we exclude China, the pattern is a smooth
increase from 0.64 in 1960 to 0.71 in 1990. This may be reconciled by the fact that Figure I in their paper is plotted
in terms of the log of GDP per capita. Although most countries’ log of GDP per capita’s in 1990 relative to the
world average are similar to those in 1960, there are a cluster of Asian countries (Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and
Korea, etc) who are positioned well above the 45 degree line and have become richer in 1990 than in 1960, relative
to the world average. The opposite is true for another cluster of African countries who start poorer in 1960 and
have become even poorer in 1990 relative to the world average. When we restrict the sample of our analysis to those
available in 1960 (89 countries), we could reproduce similar patterns as Figure I in Acemoglu and Ventura (2002),
with two clusters of economic miracles and laggards, respectively. At the same time, the calculated Gini coefficient
continues to show an increase from 1960 to 1990. Thus, although the increase in the standard deviation of income
may not be large in the log scale, as suggested by Acemoglu and Ventura (2002), the increase in the Gini coefficient
of income in terms of the original scale is clearly present.
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5.3 Effects of China’s Entry into GATT/WTO
Since the 1990s, China has grown exponentially in its production and exports: its share of world
exports has increased from 1.18% in 1990 to 11.42% in 2015; in 2013, it became the world’s largest
exporter (according to the World Bank’s World Development Indicator). Naturally, such rapid
growth in trade leads to great anxiety from its trading partners. In this section, we evaluate the
welfare effect of China’s WTO entry on the world, by shutting down China’s membership in the
counterfactual (since its accession in 2001). This is different from the analysis we have conducted
so far, where we shut down the GATT/WTO system as a whole in the counterfactual.
Figure 12 illustrates the welfare effects for a selected set of countries/custom territories. The
legends for the countries are arranged in a descending order by their mean welfare effects during
2001–2015. Hong Kong and Vietnam turn out to be the biggest winner and loser, respectively.
The large gain to Hong Kong is understandable given the intermediary role it plays in China’s
external trade, while Vietnam likely suffers due to its similarity to China in terms of comparative
advantages in production structures. China itself has benefitted the most from its decision to enter
WTO, relative to the rest of the world, although the gain is weakening in recent years. Strong
externality effects (positive or negative) tend to be concentrated in the Asian region (Singapore,
Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand), with relatively small impacts on OECD countries (UK, USA,
Germany, and Japan). Figure 13 illustrates for years 2005 and 2015, the geographical distribution
of the welfare impact. We see that for most countries in the world, the impact is relatively small in
the range of [−1%, 1%]. While the welfare impact on China itself has lightened over the years, the
color has turned warmer in Latin America, Africa, Australia, and Asia. Finally, Figure 14 illustrates
the welfare impact of China’s WTO entry for developed/developing members and nonmembers
across years. We see that the distribution has over time shifted to the right. By 2015, developed
members tend to gain, while developed nonmembers generally experience negligible welfare effects.
The biggest losers from China’s entry into WTO tend to be developing nonmember countries.
di Giovanni et al. (2014) have studied a related but different counterfactual, in which China
returns to complete autarky. As a comparison, we produce a summary table (Table 14) similar
to Table 3 (Panel A) in their study. We present the results based on the AvW model, since they
use a generalized EK model. Note that the sample of countries is much bigger here (175 in 2005
and 180 in 2015). We follow the same geographical classifications as in their study in assigning
the countries. Contrary to intuitions, Table 14 indicates bigger welfare impacts if China had not
entered GATT/WTO, than in di Giovanni et al. (2014) if China had returned to complete autarky.
This could be reconciled by the fact that the trade cost estimation in di Giovanni et al. (2014) does
not take into account policy variables related to GATT/WTO and hence may have under-estimated
the extent of China’s trade liberalization since 2001.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a comprehensive analysis of the effects of GATT/WTO on welfare
and trade for each country throughout 1950–2015. The analysis suggests a robust pattern of welfare
gains for members, and that the distribution of the gains is increasingly dispersed with a long right
tail. The developed members’ distribution clearly dominates the developing members’ by a large
margin, reflecting the differential degrees of trade liberalization undertaken by members across
development stages and in favor of developed countries’ exports. Nonmembers did not experience
welfare loss by staying outside the GATT/WTO system in earlier decades and in fact benefited from
MFN treatment extended by members to nonmembers. Such positive externality diminished after
1980, when the nonmembers’ distribution started to diverge from members’ and shifted to the left
with increasingly larger welfare losses. Welfare effects are also heterogeneous across geographical
regions with disproportionate larger gains accruing to Europe and Asia. Still, the global income
disparity across countries is lower with GATT/WTO, and the impact is especially pronounced after
1995. Thus, overall, GATT/WTO has improved the world welfare in a progressive way.
The difficulty for members to reach major agreements in the current Doha round negotiations,
however, signifies that the multilateral approach may have reached its limit, whether due to bargain-
ing frictions, weak commitment enforcement, or inefficiencies that cannot be addressed by shallow
integration. The results in this paper suggest that PTAs could potentially play a complementary
role to GATT/WTO. As an implication, it might be productive to re-think how to streamline
the provisions for PTAs under GATT/WTO (beyond the GATT Article XXIV and the Enabling
Clause), and to re-define the scopes for permissible PTAs so as to maximize their potential benefits.
In this regard, more research that quantifies how the nature or depth of PTAs affects their welfare
effects and their interactions with GATT/WTO, would seem extremely useful.
In the current paper, by working with the aggregate trade flows, we are not able to decompose
the effect of GATT/WTO by the intensive and extensive margins of exports (τ̂1−σij versus V̂ij) in
the Melitz framework. It would be interesting in future work to extend the matching estimation
to the disaggregate sectoral trade flows and identify the direct effect of GATT/WTO on these two
margins (Dutt et al., 2013). These will allow us to quantify the contributions of these two channels
on welfare, trade, and firm entry. Their relative importance will provide useful policy implications
for designing future trade agreements.
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A Math Appendix
A.1 AvW Framework
In the AvW framework, goods are differentiated by the country of origin, and buyers in each country
j choose imports qij from country i for all i to maximize
Qj =
(∑
i
b
(1−σ)/σ
i q
(σ−1)/σ
ij
)σ/(σ−1)
st.
∑
i
pijqij = Ej , (29)
where bi is a (dis)taste parameter for goods produced in i, σ > 1 the elasticity of substitution
across sources of imports, and pij ≡ piτij the destination price, equal to the exporter’s supply price
pi scaled up by the variable trade cost factor τij . The solution to (29) implies a nominal value of
exports from i to j equal to Xij =
(
bipiτij
Pj
)1−σ
Ej , where Pj =
[∑
i(bipiτij)
1−σ]1/(1−σ). The goods
market-clearing condition requires that
Yi =
∑
j
Xij
= (bipi)
1−σ∑
j
(τij/Pj)
1−σ Ej . (30)
Use (30) to solve for (bipi)
1−σ and substitute the result in the expression of Xij and Pj . We have
Xij =
YiEj
Yw
(
τij
ΠiPj
)1−σ
(31)
where
Π1−σi ≡
∑
j
(τij/Pj)
1−σej , (32)
P 1−σj =
∑
i
(τij/Πi)
1−σsi. (33)
The aggregate budget constraint remains the same as (11). In the AvW setup, goods markets are
perfectly competitive. We assume that goods are produced one-to-one from the input bundle. This
implies that the supplier price in country i is as indicated in (12). Labor-market clearing requires
that:
wiLi = βiYi. (34)
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The counterfactual equations correspond to (30) and (32)–(33) are:
ŝi = ĉ
1−σ
i Π̂
1−σ
i , (35)
Π̂1−σi =
∑
j
αij
(
τ̂ij/P̂j
)1−σ
êj , (36)
P̂ 1−σj =
∑
i
λij
(
τ̂ij/Π̂i
)1−σ
ŝi, (37)
while (20), (21), (22), and (24) introduced in the Melitz framework continue to hold in the AvW
framework. Thus, with seven counterfactual equations, we can solve for
{
ĉi, Π̂i, P̂i, ŝi, êi, ŵi, Ŷi
}
for
i = 1, 2, . . . , N , given exogenous changes in trade cost τ̂1−σij , observable variables {αij , λij , ei, si, δi, Yi}
and parameter values {1− σ, βi}. The welfare equation (27) still holds, while the trade effect is
given by
X̂ij =
τ̂1−σij
Π̂1−σi P̂
1−σ
j
ŝi Êj . (38)
Assume that the variable trade cost, ln τ1−σijt , depends on the same set of trade-cost proxies we
have identified. This will allow us to write:
ln τ1−σijt = h(bothwtoijt, imwtoijt,Zijt). (39)
By the B&B approach, the MR terms ln(ΠitPjt)
1−σ in (31) can be approximated by:
∑
k ek ln τ
1−σ
ikt +∑
m sm ln τ
1−σ
mjt −
∑
m
∑
k smek ln τ
1−σ
mkt . Thus, under log-linear approximations for the trade-cost
function h(), we arrive at the same B&B controls as in the Melitz framework. Given (31) and (39),
it also follows that we will obtain the same matching effect estimates of bothwto and imwto in the
AvW framework as in the Melitz framework, since the set of controls are the same.
A.2 Krugman Framework
In the Krugman (1980) model with homogeneous firms and CES preferences, the same set of
conditions as in AvW continue to hold, except with the following modifications. First, the market-
clearing condition in (30) is replaced by
Yi =
∑
j
Xij
= Ni(pi)
1−σ∑
j
(τij/Pj)
1−σ Ej , (40)
where Ni denotes the number of firms in country i. Second, assume that firms in i need to
incur fixed production cost fi (expressed in terms of input bundle units) in addition to a constant
input requirement ai for each unit of production. Monopolistic competition and CES preferences
imply that the supplier price charged by each firm is a constant markup over the marginal cost:
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pi =
σ
σ−1aici. Third, free entry implies zero profit in the equilibrium, and hence sales equal
production costs. Thus, labor-market clearing condition remains the same as in (34). With the use
of intermediates, however, the number of firms is no longer constant in contrast with the original
model. It is instead:
Ni =
Yi
σfici
. (41)
Since the same set of structural gravity equations (31)–(33) continue to hold, the estimation
remains the same as for the AvW setup. The counterfactual analysis is modified to account for the
change in Ni. Specifically, given the market-clearing condition (40) and constant markup pricing,
we arrive at the same counterfactual condition as (17) in the Melitz framework. Finally, (41) implies
the same counterfactual condition as (23) in the Melitz framework.
A.3 B&B Approximations in the AvW Framework
Proof. By the definition of the MR terms, we have
lnP 1−σj = ln
[∑
i
(τij
1−σ/Π1−σi )si
]
= ln
[∑
i
(eln τij
1−σ−ln Π1−σi )si
]
≈
∑
i
[
ln τij
1−σ − ln Π1−σi
]
si, (42)
where from the second to the third equation, we have taken the Taylor expansion with respect to
ln τij
1−σ and ln Π1−σi around the origin. Similarly, we have
ln Π1−σi ≈
∑
j
[
ln τij
1−σ − lnP 1−σj
]
ej . (43)
Using (43), we have ∑
i
si ln Π
1−σ
i ≈
∑
i
si
∑
j
[
ln τij
1−σ − lnP 1−σj
]
ej
=
∑
i
∑
j
[
siej ln τij
1−σ − siej lnP 1−σj
]
. (44)
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Plugging (44) in (42), we have
lnP 1−σj ≈
∑
i
si ln τij
1−σ −
∑
i
si ln Π
1−σ
i
=
∑
i
si ln τij
1−σ −
∑
i
∑
j
siej ln τij
1−σ +
∑
i
∑
j
siej lnP
1−σ
j
=
∑
i
si ln τij
1−σ −
∑
i
∑
j
siej ln τij
1−σ +
∑
j
ej lnP
1−σ
j ,
which together with (43) imply that
ln Π1−σi + lnP
1−σ
j =
∑
i
si ln τij
1−σ +
∑
j
ej ln τij
1−σ −
∑
i
∑
j
siej ln τij
1−σ.
A.4 Derivation of Equation (8)
Proof. Given (7), we can rewrite (5) as:
Π1−σi =
∑
j
(τij/Pj)
1−σ Vijej
=
∑
j
(
τij
−θfij−
θ
σ−1+1/P 1−σj
)(
Pj
θ−σ+1
)(
ci
− σθ
σ−1+σ
)(
Ej
θ
σ−1−1
)
ej
=
(
ci
− σθ
σ−1+σ
)∑
j
(
τij
−θfij−
θ
σ−1+1
)
/
(
P−θj /Ej
θ
σ−1−1
)
ej
Π1−σi /
(
ci
− σθ
σ−1+σ
)
=
∑
j
{(
τij
−θfij−
θ
σ−1+1
)
/
(
P−θj /Ej
θ
σ−1−1
)}
ej .
Similarly, we can rewrite (6) as:
P 1−σj =
∑
i
(τij/Πi)
1−σ Vijsi
=
∑
i
(
τij
−θfij−
θ
σ−1+1/Π1−σi
)(
Pj
θ−σ+1
)(
ci
− σθ
σ−1+σ
)(
Ej
θ
σ−1−1
)
si
=
(
Pj
θ−σ+1
)(
Ej
θ
σ−1−1
)∑
i
(
τij
−θfij−
θ
σ−1+1
)
/
(
Π1−σi /ci
− σθ
σ−1+σ
)
si
P−θj /Ej
θ
σ−1−1 =
∑
i
{(
τij
−θfij−
θ
σ−1+1
)
/
(
Π1−σi /ci
− σθ
σ−1+σ
)}
si.
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Define χi ≡ Π1−σi /
(
ci
− σθ
σ−1+σ
)
and ζj ≡ P−θj /Ej
θ
σ−1−1. We have χi ≡
∑
j(τij
−θfij−
θ
σ−1+1/ζj)ej
and ζj =
∑
i(τij
−θfij−
θ
σ−1+1/χi)si, and
Xij =
YiEj
Yw
(
τij
ΠiPj
)1−σ
Vij
=
YiEj
Yw
(
τij
−θfij−
θ
σ−1+1
Π1−σi P
1−σ
j
)(
Pj
θ−σ+1
)(
ci
− σθ
σ−1+σ
)(
Ej
θ
σ−1−1
)
=
YiEj
Yw
(
τij
−θfij−
θ
σ−1+1
χi ζj
)
.
A.5 B&B Approximations in the Melitz Framework
Proof. Recall that χi ≡
∑
j(τij
−θfij−
θ
σ−1+1/ζj)ej and ζj =
∑
i(τij
−θfij−
θ
σ−1+1/χi)si. The proof is
similar to that for the AvW framework, by replacing Π1−σi with χi, P
1−σ
j with ζj , and τij
1−σ with
τij
−θfij−
θ
σ−1+1.
A.6 Alternative Formulations of the Input Bundle in the Melitz Framework
Suppose instead of (12), the entry uses an input bundle with a different labor intensity, characterized
by:
cei = w
κ
i P
1−κ
i . (45)
The free-entry condition in (13) is modified to be:
σ − 1
σθ
Yi = NiFic
e
i , (46)
and the labor-market clearing condition is instead:
wiLi = βi
(
1− σ − 1
σθ
)
Yi + κ
(
σ − 1
σθ
)
Yi. (47)
In addition to (22) and (24), we have
ĉei = ŵ
κ
i P̂
1−κ
i , (48)
and the modified free-entry counterfactual equation:
Ŷi = N̂i ĉ
e
i . (49)
Thus, we have one extra set of variable {ĉei} to determine but also with one extra set of condition
(48).
To set the parameter for κ, define β¯i ≡ βi
(
1− σ−1σθ
)
+ κ
(
σ−1
σθ
)
. The value β¯i corresponds to
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the value-added share observed in the data. The assumption κ = βi corresponds to the case where
β¯i = βi. In general, following Bollard et al. (2016), we allow for the scenarios where the input
bundle used for entry is more labor intensive than in production, i.e., κ > βi. Thus, we set κ to
take on values greater than maxi{β¯i}, where maxi{β¯i} is the maximum value-added share observed
across countries in the data (0.53). In particular, we allow κ to take on values in [0.6, 0.8, 1]. Given
β¯i and κ, we then back out the values for βi.
B Data Appendix
The data used in this paper comprise three main components: trade flows, GDPs and trade-cost
proxy variables. We compile the data for the period of 1950–2015. The matching estimation is
conducted using the data in 1950–2005. The counterfactual quantitative analysis is carried out
yearly for 1950–2015, but due to space constraint, we report the results for selected years (at 5-year
or 10-year intervals).
B.1 Bilateral Trade Flows
Bilateral merchandise trade flows are obtained from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).23
They are recorded in the current US dollars. As we allow asymmetric trade cost and trade flows,
we use the CIF import value as the dependent variable, rather than the average of exports and
imports for each bilateral trade relationship (Rose, 2004).
B.2 GDP and Gross Output
We use the GDP data from the CEPII’s Gravity dataset,24,25 and supplement the missing entries
with the GDP data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).26 We construct
the gross output Yi data by taking the ratio of GDP and the value-added share βi in gross output:
Yit = GDPit/βi, where the data on βi is sourced from Caliendo and Parro (2015). In their dataset,
the share varies across sectors and countries. We take the median across sectors in each country
as the country-level value-added share. These are available for 30 countries and a ROW (as listed
in Appendix E in their paper). We use the ROW value-added share for countries included in our
analysis but not separately studied in Caliendo and Parro (2015).
We use the population data from the CEPII’s Gravity dataset, and supplement the missing
entries with the population data from WDI and the International Monetary Fund’s International
Financial Statistics (IFS).27 The data on GDP per capita are also sourced from the CEPII’s Gravity
dataset. When they are missing in CEPII, we calculate the variable by the ratio of GDP and
population as compiled above.
23http://www.imf.org/en/Data.
24http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd modele/presentation.asp?id=8.
25https://sites.google.com/site/hiegravity/data-sources.
26http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators.
27http://data.imf.org/?sk=4C514D48-B6BA-49ED-8AB9-52B0C1A0179B.
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B.3 Expenditure
Based on bilateral trade flows, we construct the trade deficit of a country by: D˜jt =
∑
iXijt −∑
iXjit. However, due to omissions, the world trade deficit D˜wt does not always sum to zero. We
allocate the discrepancy D˜wt to each country in proportion to its output share of the world, ie.,
Djt = D˜jt − sjD˜wt. The gross expenditure of a country is then constructed as: Ejt = Yjt +Djt.
B.4 Classification of Developed and Developing Countries
Rose (2004) and Subramanian and Wei (2007) classify the traditional industrialized countries as
developed countries.28 This is our benchmark. However, this classification is time invariant and
thus does not reflect the rise of newly industrialized countries. Hence, we also consider classifying a
country as developed based on the income threshold of $6,000 US dollars per capita (in 1987 prices)
used by the World Bank for high-income countries.29 These thresholds are updated annually by
the World Bank since 1987, using the IMF’s SDR (Special Drawing Rights) deflator to adjust for
inflation. We extrapolate the thresholds for the period 1960–1986 using the same SDR deflator.30
For the period 1950–1959 when the SDR deflator does not exist, we use the US GDP deflator,31 but
adjust for the difference in the levels of these two deflators by the average of their ratios in 1960–
1964. The World Bank threshold is in terms of GNI per capita, but the GNI data in earlier years
are not readily available for a large number of countries. Thus, we classify countries as developed
or developing based on their GDP per capita instead.
Together, a country is classified as developed, if its GDP per capita exceeds the threshold con-
structed above or if it belongs to the set of traditional industrialized countries listed in Subramanian
and Wei (2003). Otherwise, it is classified as a developing country.
B.5 Proxies for Asymmetric Bilateral Trade Cost
The main bulk of the trade cost variables are taken from CEPII’s Gravity dataset and GeoDist
dataset.32 The original dataset includes 225 countries. We drop French Southern and Antarctic
Lands because it does not have a permanent population.
The GATT/WTO indicator variables bothwtoijt and imwtoijt are constructed from the CEPII
variables gatt o and gatt d (which equals one if the exporting country or the importing country is
a GATT/WTO member, respectively).
The other variables used include: population-weighted bilateral distance (Distij); common
language indicator, which equals one if a language is spoken by at least 9% of the population in both
countries (ComLangij); common border indicator, which equals one if two countries are contiguous
(Borderij); common colonizer indicator, which equals one if two countries have had a common
28See Appendix Table 2 in Subramanian and Wei (2003).
29https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378833-how-are-the-income-group-thresholds-
determined.
30https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378829-what-is-the-sdr-deflator.
31https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPDEF.
32http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd modele/presentation.asp?id=6.
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colonizer after year 1945 (ComColij); same country indicator, which equals one if two countries
were or are the same state or the same administrative entity for a long period of time (25–50 years
in the twentieth century, 75 year in the nineteenth century, and 100 years before; ComNatij);
preferential trade agreement indicator, which equals one if a preferential trade agreement is in force
between two countries (PTAijt); common currency indicator, which equals one if two countries use
a common currency (ComCurijt); indicator for whether exporter i has ever been a colonizer of
importer j (Exhegij) and indicator for whether importer j has ever been a colonizer of exporter i
(Imhegij).
Because the identity of a colonizer versus a colony never swaps in the period of our study, we
construct indicator for whether exporter i is currently a colonizer of importer j based on the CEPII
variable CurColijt (whether i is currently a colony of j or vice versa) and Exhegij : Excurhegijt=1
if CurColijt=1 and Exhegij=1. The indicator for whether importer j is currently a colonizer of
exporter i is constructed in a similar way: Imcurhegijt=1 if CurColijt=1 and Imhegij=1. Data on
whether importer j offers GSP preferential treatment to exporter i (GSPijt) are obtained from the
gravity dataset used in Head et al. (2010) available via the Sciences Po website.33 We supplement
the legal origin data from CEPII with the information from La Porta et al. (1999), La Porta et al.
(2008) and the CIA’s World Factbook website,34 to construct the common legal origin indicator
(ComLegij), which equals one if two countries share a common legal origin. The information on
the number of landlocked or island countries in a pair (Landlij , Islandij) are from Andrew Rose,
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supplemented with information from the CIA’s World Factbook website.
The data on preferential trade agreement indicator (PTAijt) and the common currency indicator
(ComCurijt) are from de Sousa by default,
36 and supplemented with CEPII’s Gravity dataset. We
also update missing PTA entries using the WTO Regional Trade Agreements Information System
(RTA-IS).37
B.6 Pseudo World
For obvious reasons, we drop countries that do not have GDP data. We also drop countries that do
not import from or export to any other countries. Given the set of remaining countries, we construct
trade deficits and expenditures as discussed above, and drop countries if the constructed expenditure
is negative. We also drop countries if the implied internal trade is negative: Xii ≡ Yi−
∑
j 6=iXij < 0.
These are typically small territories whose data are prone to measurement errors. We iterate the
process of constructing trade deficits and expenditures after each round of adjustment in the set
of countries until the constructed expenditure and internal trade of all countries are positive. We
call this set of countries the pseudo world and calculate the supply and expenditure shares of each
country relative to the pseudo world.
33http://econ.sciences-po.fr/node/131.
34https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook.
35http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm.
36http://jdesousa.univ.free.fr/data.htm.
37http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx.
39
The number of countries and the total GDPs (imports) of the countries in the pseudo world
relative to the real world are reported in Table 1. As shown, the number of countries included in
the pseudo world has increased from 50 in 1950 to 180 in 2015. In spite of the small number of
countries in 1950, the pseudo world represents more than three quarters of the real world GDP and
more than 60 percent of the real world imports. The coverage has increased to 97.7 percent and
92.1 percent, respectively, by 2015. In Table 2, we also decompose the pseudo world import flows by
GATT/WTO members versus nonmembers. As shown, GATT/WTO members are proportionally
larger importers. Even in the early decades (1950–1960) when the membership size is small (26–
31), about 70.4% of the world import flows are covered under the GATT treaties, with another
13.9% imported by members from nonmembers. With the membership size continuing to grow, the
import flows among members have increased to 91.6% by 2005 and 97.4% by 2015, while those by
members from nonmembers have reduced to 4.9% in 2005 and 1.1% in 2015.
C Algorithm of the Counterfactual Analysis
When we conduct the counterfactuals, we solve the system of structural equations in terms of the hat
algebra. The nonlinear system solver “fsolve” in MATLAB is used (Anderson and Yotov, 2010; Ossa,
2014). For example, in the Melitz framework, using (17)–(26), we solve for
{
ĉit, N̂it, Π̂it, P̂it, ŝit, êit,
ŵit, Ŷit, Êit, τ̂
1−σ
ijt V̂ijt
}
for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , given exogenous changes in trade cost
{
τ̂ijt
−θf̂ijt−
θ
σ−1+1
}
due to GATT/WTO, observable variables {αijt, λijt, eit, sit, δit, Yit} and parameter values {1− σ, θ,
βi}. This is repeated for each year during 1950–2015, with the year-specific observables and the
heterogeneous trade-cost changes.
The definition and construction of variables are as introduced in the main text and the data
appendix. To reiterate, αijt = Xijt/Yit is the share of country i’s sales that goes to destination
j, and λijt = Xijt/Ejt is the share of country j’s expenditure that is spent on source i. The
expenditure and supply shares of country i are measured by: eit = Eit/Ywt and sit = Yit/Ywt,
respectively, with the world gross output measured by Ywt =
∑
i Yit. The gross output is calculated
as the ratio of GDP and the value-added share: Yit = GDPit/βi. The trade-deficit share of a
country is measured by: δit = Dit/Ywt, where the trade deficit of a country is constructed as
the excess of its aggregate expenditure over its gross output, adjusted for measurement errors as
explained above in the data appendix.
As discussed in the data appendix, we construct internal trade Xiit as the difference between a
country’s gross output Yit and its total exports. These informations on Xiit are used to construct
αiit and λiit required in the counterfactual. Note that internal trade cost does not change in response
to changes in a country’s GATT/WTO membership status. Thus, τ̂iit
−θf̂iit−
θ
σ−1+1 = 1 is set in the
counterfactual analysis. But of course, internal trade flows could change in the counterfactual due
to general equilibrium effects (such as changes in the MR terms).
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Table 1: Characteristics of countries included in the pseudo world
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
year no. of countries
in the raw data
no. of countries
in pseudo world
GDP share of the
pseudo world
Import share of the
pseudo world
no. of obs. with positive
bilateral imports
1950 50 50 0.760 0.611 1,303
1955 61 59 0.812 0.691 2,038
1960 101 89 0.840 0.802 3,173
1965 117 105 0.864 0.808 4,201
1970 127 119 0.882 0.813 6,144
1975 135 124 0.898 0.829 7,164
1980 142 123 0.908 0.800 7,518
1985 152 152 0.936 0.828 9,682
1990 152 151 0.913 0.828 11,184
1995 170 170 0.937 0.873 15,222
2000 175 175 0.941 0.940 18,476
2005 176 175 0.940 0.940 19,680
2010 174 174 0.987 0.940 20,503
2015 180 180 0.977 0.921 23,126
Note:
(a) refers to the number of countries: (i) with at least one non-missing bilateral import and one non-missing bilateral export data from DOTS, (ii) with
trade cost proxy data, and (iii) with GDP data.
(b) refers to the number of countries in the pseudo world after the iterated adjustment described in the data appendix to ensure that every country has
positive expenditure and internal trade.
(c) refers to the total GDP of the countries in the pseudo world relative to the world GDP as reported by WDI. In 1950 and 1955, the WDI did not report
the world GDP; in this case, we calculate the total GDP of the 224 CEPII countries as the approximate world GDP.
(d) refers to the total imports of the countries in the pseudo world relative to the world imports as reported by DOTS.
(e) refers to the number of observations in the pseudo world with positive bilateral imports as reported by DOTS.
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Table 2: Characteristics of countries included in the pseudo world (continued)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
year no. of countries
in pseudo world
no. of H
members
no. of L
members
no. of H
nonmembers
no. of L
nonmembers
Import share
of members
Import share of
nonmembers
Import share of
bothwto
observations
Import share of
imwto
observations
1950 50 13 13 6 18 0.844 0.157 0.704 0.139
1955 59 16 14 5 24 0.835 0.165 0.699 0.137
1960 89 16 15 7 51 0.810 0.190 0.656 0.154
1965 105 19 37 6 43 0.861 0.140 0.720 0.140
1970 119 23 46 5 45 0.904 0.096 0.806 0.098
1975 124 24 49 10 41 0.893 0.107 0.733 0.159
1980 123 26 47 11 39 0.884 0.116 0.713 0.171
1985 152 25 59 13 55 0.877 0.123 0.750 0.127
1990 151 26 65 9 51 0.943 0.057 0.861 0.082
1995 170 33 83 5 49 0.929 0.071 0.836 0.094
2000 175 37 94 6 38 0.938 0.062 0.829 0.109
2005 175 42 97 6 30 0.964 0.036 0.916 0.049
2010 174 49 94 6 25 0.962 0.038 0.911 0.051
2015 180 53 100 3 24 0.985 0.015 0.974 0.011
Note:
(a) refers to the number of countries in the pseudo world.
(b) refers to the number of developed GATT/WTO member countries in the pseudo world.
(c) refers to the number of developing GATT/WTO member countries in the pseudo world.
(d) refers to the number of developed nonmember countries in the pseudo world.
(e) refers to the number of developing nonmember countries in the pseudo world.
(f) refers to the total imports of GATT/WTO member countries relative to the total imports of the pseudo world.
(g) refers to the total imports of nonmember countries relative to the total imports of the pseudo world.
(h) refers to the total imports of country pairs where both are GATT/WTO members relative to the total imports of the pseudo world.
(i) refers to the total imports of country pairs where only the importer is a GATT/WTO member relative to the total imports of the pseudo world.
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Table 3: Development- and round-specific matching estimates of bothwto (40% Caliper)
HH LH HL LL
bothwto bothwto bothwto bothwto
GATT/WTO round caliper estimates 95% CI estimates 95% CI estimates 95% CI estimates 95% CI
Annecy to Torquay 40% 2.92 ∗∗∗ 2.65 3.19 2.22 ∗∗∗ 1.86 2.62 2.42 ∗∗∗ 1.93 2.88 0.20 -0.45 0.85
(1950–1951) M1 307 253 260 110
Torquay to Geneva 40% 2.64 ∗∗∗ 2.44 2.86 1.00 ∗∗∗ 0.73 1.26 1.33 ∗∗∗ 1.11 1.56 0.64 ∗∗∗ 0.25 1.02
(1952–1956) M1 943 834 834 363
Geneva to Dillon 40% 2.83 ∗∗∗ 2.67 3.00 1.23 ∗∗∗ 0.97 1.48 2.15 ∗∗∗ 1.89 2.39 0.28 ∗ -0.06 0.69
(1957–1961) M1 1,103 880 879 329
Dillon to Kennedy 40% 3.01 ∗∗∗ 2.84 3.16 1.41 ∗∗∗ 1.27 1.54 1.10 ∗∗∗ 0.97 1.22 0.07 -0.12 0.27
(1962–1967) M1 2,204 2,765 3,054 1,349
Kennedy to Tokyo 40% 3.69 ∗∗∗ 3.51 3.85 1.99 ∗∗∗ 1.92 2.08 1.71 ∗∗∗ 1.57 1.85 0.09 ∗ -0.02 0.20
(1968–1979) M1 5,889 10,513 10,871 9,692
Tokyo to Uruguay 40% 4.10 ∗∗∗ 3.98 4.23 2.10 ∗∗∗ 2.01 2.18 2.03 ∗∗∗ 1.95 2.12 0.81 ∗∗∗ 0.74 0.88
(1980–1994) M1 9,988 20,378 21,038 26,789
after Uruguay 40% 6.77 ∗∗∗ 6.64 6.89 5.23 ∗∗∗ 5.15 5.31 3.43 ∗∗∗ 3.35 3.50 0.09 ∗∗∗ 0.04 0.15
(1995–2005) M1 13,663 30,299 30,857 52,405
average 40% 4.08 ∗∗∗ 4.01 4.14 1.99 ∗∗∗ 1.95 2.03 2.38 ∗∗∗ 2.33 2.43 0.53 ∗∗∗ 0.49 0.57
(1950–2005) M1 34,097 65,922 67,793 91,037
Note: Based on the matching estimator of Chang and Lee (2011). Significance of the estimates and their confidence intervals are calculated based on permutation tests. The symbols
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. M1 indicates the number of treated observations. HH: developed exporting and developed
importing country pairs; LH: developing exporting and developed importing country pairs; HL: developed exporting and developing importing country pairs; LL: developing exporting
and developing importing country pairs.
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Table 4: Development- and round-specific matching estimates of imwto (40% Caliper)
HH LH HL LL
imwto imwto imwto imwto
GATT/WTO round caliper estimates 95% CI estimates 95% CI estimates 95% CI estimates 95% CI
Annecy to Torquay 40% 0.99 ∗∗∗ 0.62 1.39 1.78 ∗∗∗ 1.39 2.19 0.53 ∗ -0.15 1.16 -0.26 -0.81 0.28
(1950–1951) M1 133 293 64 128
Torquay to Geneva 40% 0.88 ∗∗∗ 0.62 1.15 0.97 ∗∗∗ 0.73 1.19 0.39 ∗∗∗ 0.11 0.65 0.19 ∗ -0.06 0.44
(1952–1956) M1 378 1,130 251 456
Geneva to Dillon 40% 0.72 ∗∗∗ 0.48 0.95 0.62 ∗∗∗ 0.45 0.80 0.22 ∗ -0.09 0.55 0.06 -0.19 0.33
(1957–1961) M1 436 1,916 225 581
Dillon to Kennedy 40% 1.13 ∗∗∗ 0.79 1.45 1.30 ∗∗∗ 1.18 1.43 -0.35 ∗∗ -0.63 -0.06 0.16 ∗∗ 0.00 0.33
(1962–1967) M1 479 3,227 318 1,590
Kennedy to Tokyo 40% 1.98 ∗∗∗ 1.59 2.35 1.58 ∗∗∗ 1.48 1.67 0.27 ∗ -0.17 0.68 -0.01 -0.12 0.09
(1968–1979) M1 1,225 8,049 919 6,454
Tokyo to Uruguay 40% 0.62 ∗∗∗ 0.31 0.90 0.82 ∗∗∗ 0.74 0.91 -0.03 -0.24 0.20 0.03 -0.06 0.12
(1980–1994) M1 2,681 14,312 2,574 13,561
after Uruguay 40% 2.16 ∗∗∗ 1.86 2.45 3.93 ∗∗∗ 3.81 4.05 0.21 ∗ -0.08 0.50 -0.29 ∗∗∗ -0.38 -0.21
(1995–2005) M1 1,407 11,885 1,814 15,822
average 40% 1.18 ∗∗∗ 1.04 1.33 1.24 ∗∗∗ 1.19 1.29 0.08 -0.07 0.22 -0.04 ∗ -0.09 0.01
(1950–2005) M1 6,739 40,812 6,165 38,592
Note: Based on the matching estimator of Chang and Lee (2011). Significance of the estimates and their confidence intervals are calculated based on permutation tests. The symbols
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. M1 indicates the number of treated observations. HH: developed exporting and developed
importing country pairs; LH: developing exporting and developed importing country pairs; HL: developed exporting and developing importing country pairs; LL: developing exporting
and developing importing country pairs.
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Table 5: Welfare effects of GATT/WTO (median)
Year 1950 Year 2015
parameters member
indicator
AvW Krugman Melitz AvW Krugman Melitz
1. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=4.5 0 1.20 1.87 1.69 -2.07 -2.75 -2.17
1 2.86 4.50 4.07 3.69 5.58 5.01
2. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=5 0 1.20 1.87 1.54 -2.07 -2.75 -1.76
(benchmark) 1 2.86 4.50 3.71 3.69 5.58 4.66
3. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=5.5 0 1.20 1.87 1.42 -2.07 -2.75 -1.44
1 2.86 4.50 3.41 3.69 5.58 4.24
4. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=6 0 1.20 1.87 1.31 -2.07 -2.75 -1.25
1 2.86 4.50 3.15 3.69 5.58 3.88
5. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=8 0 1.20 1.87 1.03 -2.07 -2.75 -0.79
1 2.86 4.50 2.40 3.69 5.58 2.90
6. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=10 0 1.20 1.87 0.83 -2.07 -2.75 -0.60
1 2.86 4.50 1.94 3.69 5.58 2.31
7. 40% caliper, σ=10, θ=10 0 0.55 0.65 0.59 -0.41 -0.47 -0.42
1 1.26 1.50 1.36 1.65 1.96 1.76
8. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=4.5 0 1.23 1.91 1.73 -3.54 -5.22 -4.48
1 2.96 4.64 4.15 3.88 6.06 5.40
9. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=5 0 1.23 1.91 1.58 -3.54 -5.22 -3.92
1 2.96 4.64 3.78 3.88 6.06 4.87
10. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=5.5 0 1.23 1.91 1.45 -3.54 -5.22 -3.49
1 2.96 4.64 3.47 3.88 6.06 4.43
11. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=6 0 1.23 1.91 1.34 -3.54 -5.22 -3.14
1 2.96 4.64 3.20 3.88 6.06 4.07
12. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=8 0 1.23 1.91 1.03 -3.54 -5.22 -2.19
1 2.96 4.64 2.45 3.88 6.06 3.11
13. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=10 0 1.23 1.91 0.83 -3.54 -5.22 -1.65
1 2.96 4.64 1.97 3.88 6.06 2.48
14. 100% caliper, σ=10, θ=10 0 0.56 0.66 0.60 -0.97 -1.14 -0.96
1 1.29 1.53 1.39 1.78 2.12 1.90
Note: The parameter value for θ is relevant only for the Melitz model. This set of analysis evaluates the effect
of GATT/WTO given the observed membership status relative to the counterfactual had GATT/WTO not existed
(bothwto = 0 and imwto = 0 for all ijt). Welfare is measured based on W1 (real output).
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Table 6: Welfare effects of GATT/WTO (75-percentile)
Year 1950 Year 2015
parameters member
indicator
AvW Krugman Melitz AvW Krugman Melitz
1. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=4.5 0 1.75 2.74 2.45 -1.28 -1.77 -1.37
1 4.40 6.66 5.99 7.29 11.36 10.35
2. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=5 0 1.75 2.74 2.22 -1.28 -1.77 -1.10
(benchmark) 1 4.40 6.66 5.46 7.29 11.36 9.39
3. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=5.5 0 1.75 2.74 2.03 -1.28 -1.77 -0.90
1 4.40 6.66 4.96 7.29 11.36 8.68
4. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=6 0 1.75 2.74 1.87 -1.28 -1.77 -0.76
1 4.40 6.66 4.53 7.29 11.36 8.06
5. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=8 0 1.75 2.74 1.44 -1.28 -1.77 -0.43
1 4.40 6.66 3.38 7.29 11.36 6.07
6. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=10 0 1.75 2.74 1.16 -1.28 -1.77 -0.29
1 4.40 6.66 2.69 7.29 11.36 4.89
7. 40% caliper, σ=10, θ=10 0 0.82 0.97 0.88 0.09 0.10 0.10
1 1.85 2.20 1.98 3.19 3.80 3.45
8. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=4.5 0 1.93 3.01 2.70 -0.78 -1.13 -0.94
1 4.56 6.91 6.15 7.27 11.44 10.79
9. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=5 0 1.93 3.01 2.45 -0.78 -1.13 -0.80
1 4.56 6.91 5.60 7.27 11.44 9.75
10. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=5.5 0 1.93 3.01 2.24 -0.78 -1.13 -0.70
1 4.56 6.91 5.12 7.27 11.44 8.84
11. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=6 0 1.93 3.01 2.06 -0.78 -1.13 -0.62
1 4.56 6.91 4.68 7.27 11.44 8.12
12. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=8 0 1.93 3.01 1.56 -0.78 -1.13 -0.42
1 4.56 6.91 3.49 7.27 11.44 6.07
13. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=10 0 1.93 3.01 1.26 -0.78 -1.13 -0.32
1 4.56 6.91 2.78 7.27 11.44 4.84
14. 100% caliper, σ=10, θ=10 0 0.90 1.07 0.97 -0.15 -0.18 -0.16
1 1.90 2.26 2.04 3.23 3.84 3.47
Note: The parameter value for θ is relevant only for the Melitz model. This set of analysis evaluates the effect
of GATT/WTO given the observed membership status relative to the counterfactual had GATT/WTO not existed
(bothwto = 0 and imwto = 0 for all ijt). Welfare is measured based on W1 (real output).
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Table 7: Welfare effects of GATT/WTO (25-percentile)
Year 1950 Year 2015
parameters member
indicator
AvW Krugman Melitz AvW Krugman Melitz
1. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=4.5 0 0.59 0.99 0.88 -3.66 -5.21 -4.60
1 1.73 2.54 2.25 1.77 2.84 2.56
2. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=5 0 0.59 0.99 0.80 -3.66 -5.21 -4.09
(benchmark) 1 1.73 2.54 2.02 1.77 2.84 2.39
3. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=5.5 0 0.59 0.99 0.73 -3.66 -5.21 -3.62
1 1.73 2.54 1.83 1.77 2.84 2.18
4. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=6 0 0.59 0.99 0.67 -3.66 -5.21 -3.24
1 1.73 2.54 1.68 1.77 2.84 2.00
5. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=8 0 0.59 0.99 0.51 -3.66 -5.21 -2.28
1 1.73 2.54 1.26 1.77 2.84 1.53
6. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=10 0 0.59 0.99 0.41 -3.66 -5.21 -1.76
1 1.73 2.54 1.02 1.77 2.84 1.24
7. 40% caliper, σ=10, θ=10 0 0.28 0.34 0.31 -0.86 -1.01 -0.89
1 0.70 0.83 0.74 0.90 1.08 0.97
8. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=4.5 0 0.77 1.29 1.15 -5.83 -8.27 -7.10
1 1.98 2.92 2.62 2.24 3.42 3.11
9. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=5 0 0.77 1.29 1.04 -5.83 -8.27 -6.21
1 1.98 2.92 2.36 2.24 3.42 2.85
10. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=5.5 0 0.77 1.29 0.95 -5.83 -8.27 -5.53
1 1.98 2.92 2.16 2.24 3.42 2.61
11. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=6 0 0.77 1.29 0.87 -5.83 -8.27 -4.97
1 1.98 2.92 1.98 2.24 3.42 2.40
12. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=8 0 0.77 1.29 0.66 -5.83 -8.27 -3.55
1 1.98 2.92 1.50 2.24 3.42 1.82
13. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=10 0 0.77 1.29 0.53 -5.83 -8.27 -2.81
1 1.98 2.92 1.20 2.24 3.42 1.46
14. 100% caliper, σ=10, θ=10 0 0.36 0.44 0.40 -1.63 -1.92 -1.69
1 0.87 1.02 0.92 0.99 1.18 1.06
Note: The parameter value for θ is relevant only for the Melitz model. This set of analysis evaluates the effect
of GATT/WTO given the observed membership status relative to the counterfactual had GATT/WTO not existed
(bothwto = 0 and imwto = 0 for all ijt). Welfare is measured based on W1 (real output).
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Table 8: Development- and round-specific matching estimates of bothwto (100% Caliper)
HH LH HL LL
bothwto bothwto bothwto bothwto
GATT/WTO round caliper estimates 95% CI estimates 95% CI estimates 95% CI estimates 95% CI
Annecy to Torquay 100% 3.54 ∗∗∗ 3.34 3.77 2.25 ∗∗∗ 1.97 2.48 2.56 ∗∗∗ 2.28 2.84 0.33 ∗ -0.14 0.81
(1950–1951) M1 307 253 260 110
Torquay to Geneva 100% 3.07 ∗∗∗ 2.94 3.19 1.48 ∗∗∗ 1.28 1.68 2.02 ∗∗∗ 1.85 2.20 0.68 ∗∗∗ 0.44 0.89
(1952–1956) M1 943 834 834 363
Geneva to Dillon 100% 3.57 ∗∗∗ 3.46 3.67 1.80 ∗∗∗ 1.62 1.97 2.74 ∗∗∗ 2.58 2.90 0.68 ∗∗∗ 0.41 0.95
(1957–1961) M1 1,103 880 879 329
Dillon to Kennedy 100% 4.22 ∗∗∗ 4.12 4.33 1.59 ∗∗∗ 1.50 1.68 2.37 ∗∗∗ 2.27 2.46 0.11 ∗∗ -0.01 0.23
(1962–1967) M1 2,204 2,765 3,054 1,349
Kennedy to Tokyo 100% 3.15 ∗∗∗ 3.05 3.25 1.94 ∗∗∗ 1.89 2.00 2.40 ∗∗∗ 2.32 2.47 0.49 ∗∗∗ 0.42 0.56
(1968–1979) M1 5,889 10,513 10,871 9,692
Tokyo to Uruguay 100% 7.07 ∗∗∗ 6.98 7.17 2.16 ∗∗∗ 2.10 2.21 2.89 ∗∗∗ 2.84 2.95 0.74 ∗∗∗ 0.69 0.79
(1980–1994) M1 9,988 20,378 21,038 26,789
after Uruguay 100% 7.74 ∗∗∗ 7.67 7.81 3.72 ∗∗∗ 3.67 3.77 4.34 ∗∗∗ 4.29 4.38 0.17 ∗∗∗ 0.14 0.21
(1995–2005) M1 13,663 30,299 30,857 52,405
average 100% 6.22 ∗∗∗ 6.17 6.27 2.81 ∗∗∗ 2.77 2.84 3.44 ∗∗∗ 3.41 3.47 0.38 ∗∗∗ 0.35 0.40
(1950–2005) M1 34,097 65,922 67,793 91,037
Note: Based on the matching estimator of Chang and Lee (2011). Significance of the estimates and their confidence intervals are calculated based on permutation tests. The symbols
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. M1 indicates the number of treated observations. HH: developed exporting and developed
importing country pairs; LH: developing exporting and developed importing country pairs; HL: developed exporting and developing importing country pairs; LL: developing exporting
and developing importing country pairs.
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Table 9: Development- and round-specific matching estimates of imwto (100% Caliper)
HH LH HL LL
imwto imwto imwto imwto
GATT/WTO round caliper estimates 95% CI estimates 95% CI estimates 95% CI estimates 95% CI
Annecy to Torquay 100% 1.42 ∗∗∗ 1.11 1.72 1.87 ∗∗∗ 1.57 2.16 0.17 -0.23 0.57 0.10 -0.23 0.46
(1950–1951) M1 133 293 64 128
Torquay to Geneva 100% 1.35 ∗∗∗ 1.13 1.55 1.37 ∗∗∗ 1.21 1.54 0.17 ∗ -0.03 0.38 0.08 -0.12 0.30
(1952–1956) M1 378 1,130 251 456
Geneva to Dillon 100% 1.51 ∗∗∗ 1.32 1.68 1.31 ∗∗∗ 1.19 1.44 0.23 ∗∗ -0.01 0.46 0.07 -0.12 0.25
(1957–1961) M1 436 1,916 225 581
Dillon to Kennedy 100% 2.02 ∗∗∗ 1.81 2.24 1.74 ∗∗∗ 1.65 1.82 -0.06 -0.28 0.16 0.12 ∗∗ 0.02 0.22
(1962–1967) M1 479 3,227 318 1,590
Kennedy to Tokyo 100% 1.71 ∗∗∗ 1.47 1.97 1.64 ∗∗∗ 1.58 1.71 0.33 ∗∗∗ 0.07 0.57 0.14 ∗∗∗ 0.06 0.22
(1968–1979) M1 1,225 8,049 919 6,454
Tokyo to Uruguay 100% 2.55 ∗∗∗ 2.37 2.72 1.35 ∗∗∗ 1.28 1.42 0.14 ∗∗ -0.03 0.30 0.15 ∗∗∗ 0.09 0.22
(1980–1994) M1 2,681 14,312 2,574 13,561
after Uruguay 100% 3.25 ∗∗∗ 3.05 3.45 3.94 ∗∗∗ 3.86 4.01 0.48 ∗∗∗ 0.29 0.66 -0.15 ∗∗∗ -0.21 -0.09
(1995–2005) M1 1,407 11,885 1,814 15,822
average 100% 2.35 ∗∗∗ 2.26 2.45 2.19 ∗∗∗ 2.16 2.23 0.26 ∗∗∗ 0.17 0.36 0.02 -0.01 0.06
(1950–2005) M1 6,739 40,812 6,165 38,592
Note: Based on the matching estimator of Chang and Lee (2011). Significance of the estimates and their confidence intervals are calculated based on permutation tests. The symbols
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. M1 indicates the number of treated observations. HH: developed exporting and developed
importing country pairs; LH: developing exporting and developed importing country pairs; HL: developed exporting and developing importing country pairs; LL: developing exporting
and developing importing country pairs.
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Table 10: Firm entry effects of GATT/WTO (Melitz vs BKL; median)
Year 1950 Year 2015
parameters member
indicator
Melitz BKL
κ = 0.6
BKL
κ = 0.8
BKL
κ = 1
Melitz BKL
κ = 0.6
BKL
κ = 0.8
BKL
κ = 1
1. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=4.5 0 0.99 0.67 0.34 0 -1.28 -0.87 -0.44 0
1 2.38 1.61 0.80 0 2.90 1.97 0.98 0
2. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=5 0 0.90 0.61 0.31 0 -1.04 -0.71 -0.35 0
(benchmark) 1 2.17 1.47 0.73 0 2.64 1.84 0.91 0
3. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=5.5 0 0.83 0.56 0.28 0 -0.85 -0.58 -0.29 0
1 2.00 1.35 0.67 0 2.41 1.67 0.83 0
4. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=6 0 0.77 0.52 0.26 0 -0.74 -0.50 -0.25 0
1 1.84 1.25 0.62 0 2.22 1.53 0.76 0
5. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=8 0 0.60 0.41 0.20 0 -0.46 -0.32 -0.16 0
1 1.40 0.95 0.48 0 1.68 1.15 0.57 0
6. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=10 0 0.49 0.33 0.17 0 -0.35 -0.24 -0.12 0
1 1.12 0.77 0.39 0 1.35 0.92 0.46 0
7. 40% caliper, σ=10, θ=10 0 0.35 0.24 0.12 0 -0.25 -0.17 -0.08 0
1 0.80 0.54 0.27 0 1.02 0.70 0.35 0
8. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=4.5 0 1.01 0.69 0.34 0 -2.66 -1.82 -0.91 0
1 2.43 1.64 0.82 0 3.12 2.13 1.06 0
9. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=5 0 0.92 0.63 0.31 0 -2.32 -1.59 -0.80 0
1 2.21 1.50 0.75 0 2.82 1.92 0.96 0
10. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=5.5 0 0.85 0.58 0.29 0 -2.06 -1.41 -0.71 0
1 2.03 1.37 0.68 0 2.58 1.75 0.87 0
11. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=6 0 0.78 0.53 0.27 0 -1.86 -1.27 -0.64 0
1 1.88 1.27 0.63 0 2.37 1.61 0.80 0
12. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=8 0 0.60 0.41 0.20 0 -1.29 -0.88 -0.44 0
1 1.42 0.97 0.48 0 1.79 1.23 0.61 0
13. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=10 0 0.49 0.33 0.17 0 -0.97 -0.66 -0.33 0
1 1.13 0.79 0.39 0 1.44 0.99 0.49 0
14. 100% caliper, σ=10, θ=10 0 0.35 0.24 0.12 0 -0.57 -0.39 -0.19 0
1 0.82 0.55 0.28 0 1.10 0.76 0.38 0
Note: Based on the Melitz or BKL framework. This set of analysis evaluates the effects of GATT/WTO given the observed
membership status relative to the counterfactual had GATT/WTO not existed (bothwto = 0 and imwto = 0 for all ijt).
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Table 11: Welfare effects of GATT/WTO (Melitz vs BKL; median)
Year 1950 Year 2015
parameters member
indicator
Melitz BKL
κ = 0.8
BKL
κ = 1
Melitz BKL
κ = 0.8
BKL
κ = 1
1. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=4.5 0 1.6903 1.6903 1.6903 -2.1656 -2.1656 -2.1656
1 4.0703 4.0703 4.0703 5.0067 5.0067 5.0067
2. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=5 0 1.5416 1.5416 1.5416 -1.7612 -1.7612 -1.7612
(benchmark) 1 3.7111 3.7111 3.7111 4.6578 4.6578 4.6578
3. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=5.5 0 1.4159 1.4159 1.4159 -1.4431 -1.4431 -1.4431
1 3.4067 3.4067 3.4067 4.2362 4.2362 4.2362
4. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=6 0 1.3096 1.3096 1.3096 -1.2518 -1.2518 -1.2518
1 3.1464 3.1464 3.1464 3.8772 3.8772 3.8772
5. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=8 0 1.0252 1.0252 1.0252 -0.7892 -0.7892 -0.7892
1 2.4037 2.4037 2.4037 2.8956 2.8956 2.8956
6. 40% caliper, σ=5, θ=10 0 0.8299 0.8299 0.8299 -0.6021 -0.6021 -0.6021
1 1.9414 1.9414 1.9414 2.3149 2.3149 2.3149
7. 40% caliper, σ=10, θ=10 0 0.5905 0.5905 0.5905 -0.4198 -0.4198 -0.4198
1 1.3593 1.3593 1.3593 1.7629 1.7629 1.7629
8. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=4.5 0 1.7291 1.7291 1.7291 -4.4764 -4.4764 -4.4764
1 4.1491 4.1491 4.1491 5.4019 5.4019 5.4019
9. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=5 0 1.5772 1.5772 1.5772 -3.9207 -3.9207 -3.9207
1 3.7811 3.7811 3.7811 4.8695 4.8695 4.8695
10. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=5.5 0 1.4488 1.4488 1.4488 -3.4882 -3.4882 -3.4882
1 3.4696 3.4696 3.4696 4.4318 4.4318 4.4318
11. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=6 0 1.3390 1.3390 1.3390 -3.1418 -3.1418 -3.1418
1 3.2036 3.2036 3.2036 4.0686 4.0686 4.0686
12. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=8 0 1.0255 1.0255 1.0255 -2.1935 -2.1935 -2.1935
1 2.4456 2.4456 2.4456 3.1084 3.1084 3.1084
13. 100% caliper, σ=5, θ=10 0 0.8299 0.8299 0.8299 -1.6512 -1.6512 -1.6512
1 1.9746 1.9746 1.9746 2.4831 2.4831 2.4831
14. 100% caliper, σ=10, θ=10 0 0.6005 0.6005 0.6005 -0.9643 -0.9643 -0.9643
1 1.3857 1.3857 1.3857 1.9031 1.9031 1.9031
Note: Based on the Melitz or BKL framework. This set of analysis evaluates the effect of GATT/WTO given the observed
membership status relative to the counterfactual had GATT/WTO not existed (bothwto = 0 and imwto = 0 for all ijt). Welfare
is measured based on W1 (real output).
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Table 12: Welfare effects of GATT/WTO by regions
Mean Median Min Max Countries
Panel A. Ex-post welfare effects of GATT/WTO (AvW, 1950)
OECD 2.45 2.15 0.12 6.17 18
East and South Asia 1.89 1.06 0.67 4.43 7
East. Europe and Cent. Asia . . . . .
Latin America and Caribbean 2.48 1.96 1.04 7.75 18
Middle East and North Africa 1.77 1.94 0.16 3.64 6
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 1
Other . . . . .
Panel B. Ex-post welfare effects of GATT/WTO (AvW, 2015)
OECD 8.35 7.29 2.46 26.91 23
East and South Asia 4.60 2.18 -5.14 25.44 24
East. Europe and Cent. Asia 6.32 2.55 -4.16 27.94 15
Latin America and Caribbean 3.86 3.00 0.42 12.83 31
Middle East and North Africa 3.53 2.09 -4.34 20.23 22
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.71 1.72 -13.43 13.45 45
Other 3.84 4.58 -40.87 20.61 20
Panel C. Ex-post welfare effects of GATT/WTO (Krugman, 1950)
OECD 3.77 3.23 0.20 9.44 18
East and South Asia 2.90 1.64 1.05 6.62 7
East. Europe and Cent. Asia . . . . .
Latin America and Caribbean 3.83 2.98 1.43 12.27 18
Middle East and North Africa 2.72 3.03 0.28 5.55 6
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 1
Other . . . . .
Panel D. Ex-post welfare effects of GATT/WTO (Krugman, 2015)
OECD 13.38 11.36 3.67 44.64 23
East and South Asia 7.35 3.47 -7.04 41.56 24
East. Europe and Cent. Asia 10.59 3.97 -5.86 46.51 15
Latin America and Caribbean 6.02 4.69 0.84 20.63 31
Middle East and North Africa 5.70 3.05 -6.08 32.20 22
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.86 2.77 -16.85 21.36 45
Other 7.14 7.14 -48.52 33.68 20
Note: Based on the 40% caliper estimates in Tables 3 and 4 that are significant at 10% level, using the
AvW or Krugman framework with parameters σ = 5 and βi from Caliendo and Parro (2015). The
welfare effect of GATT/WTO (based on real output) is calculated given the observed membership
status relative to the counterfactual had GATT/WTO not existed (bothwto = 0 and imwto = 0 for
all ijt).
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Table 13: Development-specific matching effect estimates of PTA
HH LH
PTA PTA
caliper estimates 95% CI caliper estimates 95% CI
100% 1.93 ∗∗∗ 1.88 1.98 100% 1.65 ∗∗∗ 1.55 1.74
40% 1.26 ∗∗∗ 1.20 1.32 40% 1.25 ∗∗∗ 1.14 1.37
M1 9,667 M1 3,931
HL LL
PTA PTA
caliper estimates 95% CI caliper estimates 95% CI
100% 1.46 ∗∗∗ 1.39 1.54 100% 1.54 ∗∗∗ 1.48 1.61
40% 1.12 ∗∗∗ 1.02 1.20 40% 1.34 ∗∗∗ 1.24 1.44
M1 3,936 M1 11,682
Note: See Table 3 footnote.
Table 14: Welfare effects of China’s entry into WTO
Mean Median Min Max Countries
Panel A. Welfare effects of China’s entry (AvW, 2005)
China 6.27
OECD 0.31 0.24 0.06 1.10 23
East and South Asia -0.30 -0.44 -4.23 6.52 21
East. Europe and Cent. Asia -0.47 -0.46 -1.65 0.55 15
Latin America and Caribbean -0.60 -0.44 -3.09 0.61 33
Middle East and North Africa -0.18 -0.47 -1.66 1.54 23
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.48 -0.39 -2.12 0.95 40
Other -0.06 -0.26 -0.96 3.24 19
Panel B. Welfare effects of China’s entry (AvW, 2015)
China 2.64
OECD 0.49 0.36 0.16 1.48 23
East and South Asia -0.09 -0.21 -4.03 5.72 23
East. Europe and Cent. Asia -0.12 -0.25 -1.06 1.14 15
Latin America and Caribbean -0.16 -0.31 -1.39 1.73 31
Middle East and North Africa 0.32 0.02 -0.73 4.46 22
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.33 -0.32 -1.68 0.52 45
Others 0.05 -0.08 -0.53 1.68 20
Note: Based on the 40% caliper estimates in Tables 3 and 4 that are significant at 10% level, using
the AvW framework with parameters σ = 5 and βi from Caliendo and Parro (2015). The welfare
effect (based on real output) is calculated using the counterfactual had China not entered WTO in
2001.
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Figure 1: Welfare effects of GATT/WTO (the AvW framework)
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Note: Based on the 40% caliper estimates in Tables 3 and 4 that are significant at 10% level, using the
AvW framework with parameters σ = 5 and βi from Caliendo and Parro (2015). This set of analysis
evaluates the effects of GATT/WTO given the observed membership status relative to the counterfactual
had GATT/WTO not existed (bothwto = 0 and imwto = 0 for all ijt). The y-axis indicates the number of
countries, and the x-axis the % change in welfare (real output). Outliers are omitted.
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Figure 2: Effects of GATT/WTO on inward multilateral resistance (the AvW framework)
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Note: See Figure 1 footnote. The y-axis indicates the number of countries, and the x-axis the % change in
Pj . Outliers are omitted.
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Figure 3: Effects of GATT/WTO on outward multilateral resistance (the AvW framework)
(a) 1950 (b) 1955
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Note: See Figure 1 footnote. The y-axis indicates the number of countries, and the x-axis the % change in
Πi. Outliers are omitted.
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Figure 4: Effects of GATT/WTO on trade share (the AvW framework)
(a) 1950 (b) 1955
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Note: See Figure 1 footnote. The y-axis indicates the number of countries, and the x-axis the trade share
(Importj/Ej). Outliers are omitted.
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Figure 5: Welfare effects of GATT/WTO (the Krugman framework)
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Note: Based on the 40% caliper estimates in Tables 3 and 4 that are significant at 10% level, using the
Krugman framework with parameters σ = 5 and βi from Caliendo and Parro (2015). This set of analysis
evaluates the effects of GATT/WTO given the observed membership status relative to the counterfactual
had GATT/WTO not existed (bothwto = 0 and imwto = 0 for all ijt). The y-axis indicates the number of
countries, and the x-axis the % change in welfare (real output). Outliers are omitted.
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Figure 6: Firm entry effects of GATT/WTO (the Krugman framework)
(a) 1950 (b) 1955
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Note: See Figure 5 footnote. The y-axis indicates the number of countries, and the x-axis the % change in
the mass of firm entrants. Outliers are omitted.
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Figure 7: Welfare effects of GATT/WTO (the Melitz framework)
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0
2
4
6
8
-10 0 10 20
H member
L member
H nonmember
L nonmember
0
5
10
15
-10 0 10 20
H member
L member
H nonmember
L nonmember
(c) 1965 (d) 1975
0
5
10
15
-10 0 10 20
H member
L member
H nonmember
L nonmember
0
5
10
15
-10 0 10 20
H member
L member
H nonmember
L nonmember
(e) 1985 (f) 1995
0
10
20
30
-10 0 10 20
H member
L member
H nonmember
L nonmember
0
5
10
15
20
-10 0 10 20
H member
L member
H nonmember
L nonmember
(g) 2005 (h) 2015
0
5
10
15
-10 0 10 20
H member
L member
H nonmember
L nonmember
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10 0 10 20
H member
L member
H nonmember
L nonmember
Note: Based on the 40% caliper estimates in Tables 3 and 4 that are significant at 10% level, using the
Melitz framework with parameters σ = 5, θ = 5, and βi from Caliendo and Parro (2015). This set of analysis
evaluates the effects of GATT/WTO given the observed membership status relative to the counterfactual
had GATT/WTO not existed (bothwto = 0 and imwto = 0 for all ijt). The y-axis indicates the number of
countries, and the x-axis the % change in welfare (real output). Outliers are omitted.
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Figure 8: GATT/WTO welfare effects (Left: Melitz versus Krugman / Right: Melitz versus AvW)
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Note: See Figures 1, 5 and 7 footnotes. This figure compares the Melitz framework relative to the Krugman and the
AvW framework in their effects for members (in red) and nonmembers (in blue), respectively: (WM −WK)/WK ;
(WM −WA)/WA. The box plot indicates the 25 percentile (the lower hinge of the box), the median, and the 75
percentile (the upper hinge of the box) of the variable of interest. Outliers are omitted.
Figure 9: Welfare effects of GATT/WTO (without PTA versus with PTA)
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Note: Based on the 40% caliper estimates in Tables 3, 4 and 13 that are significant at 10% level, using the AvW
framework with parameters σ = 5 and βi from Caliendo and Parro (2015). This set of analysis evaluates the welfare
effects of GATT/WTO under the scenario had all PTAs not existed relative to the scenario with the factual PTAs.
Outliers are omitted.
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Figure 10: Welfare effects of GATT/WTO for a selected set of countries
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Note: Based on the 40% caliper estimates in Tables 3 and 4 that are significant at 10% level, using the AvW or Krugman framework with parameters σ = {5, 10} and
βi from Caliendo and Parro (2015). This set of analysis evaluates the effects of GATT/WTO given the observed membership status relative to the counterfactual
had GATT/WTO not existed (bothwto = 0 and imwto = 0 for all ijt). Welfare is measured based on W1 (real output).
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Figure 10 (continued): Welfare effects of GATT/WTO for a selected set of countries
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Note: Based on the 40% caliper estimates in Tables 3 and 4 that are significant at 10% level, using the AvW or Krugman framework with parameters σ = {5, 10} and
βi from Caliendo and Parro (2015). This set of analysis evaluates the effects of GATT/WTO given the observed membership status relative to the counterfactual
had GATT/WTO not existed (bothwto = 0 and imwto = 0 for all ijt). Welfare is measured based on W1 (real output).
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Figure 11: Effects of GATT/WTO on global income disparity
(a) 1950–2005: all available countries (b) 1980–2005: 118 common countries
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(c) 1950–2015: all available countries (d) 1980–2015: 111 common countries
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Note: Based on the 40% caliper estimates in Tables 3 and 4 that are significant at 10% level, using the AvW or Krugman framework with parameters
σ = {5, 10} and βi from Caliendo and Parro (2015). The factual Gini coefficient is calculated using the factual GDP per capita (weighted by country
populations), against the counterfactual Gini coefficient had GATT/WTO not existed (bothwto = 0 and imwto = 0 for all ijt).
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Figure 12: Welfare effects of China’s entry into WTO
(a) AvW (σ = 5) (b) Krugman (σ = 5)
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Note: Based on the 40% caliper estimates in Tables 3 and 4 that are significant at 10% level, using the AvW or Krugman
framework with parameters σ = 5 and βi from Caliendo and Parro (2015). The welfare effect (based on real output) is
calculated using the counterfactual had China not entered WTO in 2001.
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Figure 13: Welfare effects of China’s entry into WTO (world map)
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Note: Based on the 40% caliper estimates in Tables 3 and 4 that are significant at 10% level, using the AvW framework with
parameters σ = 5 and βi from Caliendo and Parro (2015). The welfare effect (based on real output) is calculated using the
counterfactual had China not entered WTO in 2001.
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Figure 14: Welfare effects of China’s entry into WTO (distribution)
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Note: Based on the 40% caliper estimates in Tables 3 and 4 that are significant at 10% level, using the AvW framework
with parameters σ = 5 and βi from Caliendo and Parro (2015). The welfare effect (based on real output) is calculated
using the counterfactual had China not entered WTO in 2001. Outliers are omitted.
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